THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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IN MEMORIAM

CHARLES JAMES SHARP

THE sudden death of the Rev. C. J. Sharp, Vicar of Ealing, comes with a shock to a very large body of friends in Modernist circles. Mr. Sharp had been a prominent member of the Council of the Modern Churchmen's Union for a quarter of a century. His membership of the Council goes back to those early days when Sir Thomas Dyke-Acland was President: Lord Avebury, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, Professor Henslow and Mr. Philip Bagenal were among the Vice-Presidents: and on the Council sat the Rev. Canon Papillon, the Rev. A. W. Hutton of Bow Church, the Rev. W. A. Cunningham Craig of St. Sepulchre's, Holborn, the Rev. Ronald Bayne of St. Edmund the Martyr, the Rev. Canon Glazebrook and the Rev. W. Manning (Secretary)—all now no longer with us.

Mr. Sharp enjoyed in a very large degree the respect and affection of his contemporaries. He was a man of wide human sympathies and threw himself vigorously into the causes of both ecclesiastical and social reform. Born in the Metropolis, he spent all his clerical life from 1887 to 1933 in Metropolitan parishes. He was a popular vicar of Christchurch, Crouch End, and became Vicar of Ealing in 1916. Later he became Rural Dean, but owing to his openly-expressed views of disbelief in the Virgin Birth and the clerical agitation which ensued in his rural deanery as the result of this declaration, he felt compelled to resign. He was a regular and valued attendant at the annual Modern Churchmen's Conferences, and many will miss his genial presence there.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

'A Society for the Propagation of Superstition and Intellectual Sloth.'

The Nineteenth Century of December, 1933, contains a trenchant article by Donald Carswell entitled 'Obscurantism.' In it this writer charges the Church of England with being the victim of photophobia, and asserts that under the influence of the Anglo-Catholic movement it has been for more than a generation organizing itself into 'a Society for the Propagation of Superstition and Intellectual Sloth.'

The charge is a serious one, but it represents the conviction of an increasing number of the laity. It is, however, unfair to blame the Anglo-Catholics alone for this. There has been at least as much, indeed more, obscurantism in fundamentalist Evangelical circles. The lure of primitiveness, as the late Professor Swete pointed out, can prove as dangerous and detrimental as the lure of mediaevalism. Dogmatic reform is a crying need, but it appears to the Church authorities to be much too dangerous to achieve at the present time. Ten years ago the Archbishops' Doctrinal Commission was appointed, and we have had several interim reports but no doctrinal reform during the decade.

Mr. Carswell maintains that many of the Church's 'stunts' are simply devices which provide it with excuses for not doing what it needs so urgently to do. He declares:

> 'that the Church of England has yielded to one of the most pernicious temptations to which human nature is subject — the temptation to shirk an uncomfortable task by discovering a fictitious urgency in other things so that we may mask our sloth and soothe our consciences by a great parade of praiseworthy activities. Indolence has a marvellous knack of disguising itself as industry.'

We need to-day a drastic simplification of Doctrine: a great reduction in the number of our *credenda*: a radical purgation from our Church's formularies and liturgies of discredited ways of thinking and incredible affirmations about the Divine Nature and Divine modes of action. It is this needful doctrinal reform which the Modernist is convinced must precede sound liturgical reform. Three hundred years ago, Richard Baxter, no sceptic, wrote: 'The plague of the Church for above a thousand years has been the enlarging our Creed and making more fundamentals than God ever made.'

We need to express these fundamentals in accordance with our present-day Christian experience and our present-day knowledge of the Universe. If, as a Church, we had but the courage and insight to do this openly and unflinchingly we should secure a great return to the Church of multitudes who have abandoned it as hopelessly obscurantist and superstitious.

The notion that the Church can carry out its duty without possessing a clearly formulated Christian creed is absurd, but it is almost equally absurd to suppose that the Church can do its work effectively in the modern world by adhering to the use of dogmatic formularies and liturgical services which are in conflict with modern convictions and experience. When Modernists call upon the Church authorities to carry out dogmatic and liturgical reform in a spirit of courage and wisdom, they are not to be charged with any desire to compel their fellow-churchmen to accept new creeds and revised services which are repugnant to them. Modernists believe in the principle of alternatives and the right of congregations in co-operation with the Church authorities to determine which of the alternatives shall be used. By this means the old and the new exist side by side and usage determines which shall prevail. Of course, that closely organized body of Churchmen whose ecclesiastical model is the Church of Rome, and whose final objective is to lead the Church of England back to obedience to an unreformed Papacy, will oppose this policy tooth and nail. And bishops whose highest conception of their episcopal obligations is to maintain peace at any price are not likely to do anything to secure dogmatic reform. We are persuaded, however, that these bishops are a minority of the Upper Houses of Convocation, and we hope that in the near future those Houses will accomplish this imperative task and remove our reproach from among the intelligent classes of the nation. The need for the abolition of slums, the reduction of armaments, the promotion of international peace, and any number of other practical activities and pressing needs can provide no valid excuse for further postponement of dogmatic reform.

Tertullian in a memorable saying declared that 'Christ called Himself the Truth : He did not call Himself Tradition,' and Christian leaders who for fear of Tradition avoid the reformulation of the Truth neglect a fundamental Christian duty.

Dean Inge's prophetic reply, addressed to one who suggested that Christianity might fail, should inspire to action our timid traditionalists :

> ' Believe me, if Christianity is ever rejected as obsolete, it will be because the conscience of humanity has advanced while Christian teachers have refused to move an inch, and prefer the tradition of the elders to the living voice of the Holy Spirit of truth.'

Professor Julian Huxley and the Bible.

Professor Julian Huxley, in an article entitled ' Is the Bible fit for children to read in the *News-Chronicle* of November 14th deals with the problem of whether the Bible should be used as 'the keystone of religious instruction for children.' The Professor in dealing with this question shares the conviction of his distinguished grandfather, the first agnostic, who favoured the use of the Bible in schools. Professor Julian Huxley writes :

> ' Personally, I should be extremely sorry to see a knowledge of the Bible die out among large sections of our population.
>
> ' For one thing, there are so many biblical incidents, so many biblical characters, that have been woven into the texture of our national heritage of ideas. For another, some of the books of the Bible are magnificent literature. And finally, as a record of one of the most important phases in man's struggle towards religious progress, the Bible is intensely valuable.'

On the other hand he recognizes, as every thoughtful and philanthropic individual must, that the use of the Bible is fraught with serious dangers and disadvantages.

> ' I do regard the unintelligent use of the Bible in religious teaching as fraught with the gravest possibilities of harm. In the first place, to regard the Bible as something perfect and final, in an entirely different category from any other book, is to me simply superstition . . .
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> ' It is when children are taught that the Bible is literally inspired, and that it is the only avenue to their religious salvation which they need study, that the reading of it becomes undesirable for them.
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> ' Either they swallow it whole and carry on with their mind organised into water-tight compartments, one for the Bible and religion, another for the life around them ; or they become a prey to conflict, trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, deeply puzzled as to how to fit the facts and ideas they have gleaned from the Bible, which they have been told are divinely inspired or at least in a different and superior category of authority and holiness from all others, into some relation with the facts and ideas at the basis of our modern civilization and outlook that they imbibe as they grow up. This country is full of people suffering from the effects of such conflicts.'

Professor Julian Huxley seizes on the crucial issue of the right use of the Bible when he claims that it must be used to teach not traditionalism but moral and religious evolution.

'Once you accept that there can and should be progress in morality and in religion, the Bible becomes the most interesting and the most helpful of all the world's sacred books, for the very reason that, to a greater extent than any of the others, it is the record, over a space of more than three thousand years, of just such a development.'

The Professor's conclusion is equally cogent:

'This point of view in religious teaching has, of course, an important corollary. It is that if religious progress was possible and desirable in the past, it is equally possible and equally desirable in the present. We to-day fall short of the ideal of living, and fall short just as radically — relatively to our circumstances and the state of our civilization — as did the early Jews relatively to theirs.

'If the Bible is used to illustrate the fact of moral and religious progress in the past and to point the way to the possibility of moral and religious progress in the future, it is an admirable instrument of religious instruction; but if it is used as an object of worship or as in any way a fetish in the realm of ideas, then indeed it is not fit for children to read.'

The Modern Churchmen's Conference for 1934.

The next Modern Churchmen's Conference will be held on September 3rd—8th, 1934, at Birmingham, in the three Selly Oak Colleges. The Conference will take as its theme, 'The Bible and the Modern Man.'

This theme is certainly not new, but it no less certainly demands well-informed treatment. English people are rapidly ceasing, if they have not entirely ceased, to use their Bibles. This is not due to their percentage of original sin being greater than that of their fathers and grandfathers, but is due to their not knowing what use to make of their Bibles and to their doubting if their Bibles have any use at all which cannot be more adequately served by the B.B.C., the plays of Bernard Shaw, and the perusal of what a distinguished bishop described as 'goody-goody' books.

The New Testament dialogue between Philip the deacon and the treasurer of the Queen of the Ethiopians is still pertinent. Philip hearing him reading aloud the prophet Isaiah said, 'Understandest thou what thou readest?' and he replied, 'How can I except some man should guide me?' Then Philip sat with him and opened unto him the Scriptures. The modern method of 'opening the Scriptures' must differ greatly from the Primitive method, but without such an 'opening of the Scriptures,' the Scriptures must become either a closed and neglected volume or else a source of pathetic fallacies and pestilential notions.

It is with the hope of doing something to open the Scriptures to modern men and women that the Birmingham Conference is being planned. We have good reason to believe that the distinguished scholars and thinkers who will take part in this Conference will give real help in this direction.

The cultural level of Christian congregations requires to be raised very considerably if they are to understand the Scriptures aright. The crux of the present situation is not that the Scriptures are below the level of ordinary church people and unworthy of their understanding, but that the congregations are below the cultural level demanded for the proper appreciation of the Scriptures and that the clergy are not competent in many cases to teach the Scriptures in accordance with the best knowledge of the day.

The Bible, as a whole, is not a suitable text-book for the lowest forms, but only for the highest, and it demands highly-trained teachers. It was the learned and many-sided Thomas Fuller who wrote in the seventeenth century, 'If men will not feed on the good meat of the Word, let them not marvel if they be choked with its dry bones.'

'This Book,' said St. Augustine, 'has pools at which lambs may drink, but it has also depths in which elephants must swim.'

The Church Assembly and Contraceptives.

On November 17th, the Church Assembly passed without a single dissentient the following resolution:

> 'That the Assembly notes with alarm the rapid increase in the indiscriminate dissemination through the agency of the post office, and in other ways, of announcements, circulars, and catalogues, offering contraceptive appliances for sale, and urgently requests His Majesty's Government to introduce legislation at an early date to stop the practice.'

Two bishops (London and St. Albans) spoke strongly in favour of the resolution. Only one layman, the mover, appears to have spoken in the debate. It is significant that both the episcopal speakers are bachelors.

If it be morally permissible to use contraceptives, and the Lambeth Conference decided that it is, there is no sound reason for prohibiting the advertizing of contraceptives unless the advertisements themselves are of such a kind as to offend public decency. If the advertizers offend against public decency, they

can be prosecuted and punished under the existing laws. Hence there is no need for further legislation. This is undoubtedly the view of both Houses of Parliament where it has proved impossible for two years past to get any member of those Houses to introduce legislation of the character which the Church Assembly demanded without a single dissentient. Is this difference between the mind of the Church Assembly and the mind of Parliament due to the morality of the Church Assembly or to its muddle-headedness?

The Church of England as represented in the Church Assembly, and once again it is clear how very inadequately it is represented there, must decide clearly and consistently the great issue so trenchantly expressed in Archbishop Magee's aphorism 'that he would rather have England free than England sober.'

Are we to be treated as responsible people and to be given all knowledge that is necessary for right decisions, and are we to be trusted, having received such knowledge, to use it rightly? Or is knowledge to be withheld and people left to muddle through in ignorance and stupidity?

A correspondent from St. Hilda's College, Oxford, writing to the *Spectator* of November 24th, sets forth succinctly the moral issue:

> 'No clergyman, in my opinion, neglects his duty by allowing the knowledge of contraceptive methods to be freely disseminated among his congregation, both married and unmarried. Morality cannot rest upon the fear of consequences, and if it is only because lovers fear to have children that they keep apart, they are no more moral than those who either take the risk or take precautions. The clergy have got to make up their minds whether it is their duty to prevent at all costs certain things from happening, or whether it is to help people to become morally responsible people, who are able to judge between right and wrong and act according to their convictions.'

But in this matter will the clergy have done their duty if they simply remain silent and allow others to give the information?

A clergyman, under the *nom de plume* of Nicodemus, writing to the *Spectator* on the same day that the Church Assembly passed its resolution, pointed out the danger to which his reputation would be exposed should he give advice in favour of the use of contraceptives to his parishioners when requesting it. To this plea the *Spectator's* reviewer replied in the following terms:

> 'To my mind it is pathetic that because he might be misrepresented "Nicodemus" refuses to answer a youth who, having just enough money to marry but not enough yet for a family, asks his advice whether

he is right to postpone the latter: or that he will not tell a father of eight who cannot feed even his existing family that it is sinful to have more children. Yet even Rome teaches (theoretically) that "in a genuine case of inability to maintain a large family limitation of children is a duty" . . . There is no greater need to-day than that the clergy will influence their people in favour of greater discernment in giving birth to children and thus help to relieve the next generation from our present overwhelming numbers of mental, moral and physical defectives.'

A UNITARIAN PREACHER IN LIVERPOOL CATHEDRAL.

The invitation to a distinguished Unitarian minister, the Rev. Lawrence Redfern, M.A., B.D., to preach in Liverpool Cathedral on October 22nd, 1933, provoked a protest on the part of Lord Hugh Cecil and other English Churchmen and even the threat of legal proceedings.

It seems deplorable when we talk so much about the need for Christians drawing together and the need for a united Christian front in the face of secularist propaganda, that this public protest should have been made. Those who know something of modern Unitarianism know that to-day it is based upon a practical affirmation rather than on a theological negation — the affirmation of the need for Freedom in Christian Faith and Worship. Hardly any protest could be more untimely than one which mid the doubts and difficulties which beset the Christian Faith to-day would dictate to modern men what they must believe and how precisely they ought to worship. Surely it was against such ecclesiastical tyranny that St. Peter himself protested to his fellow-presbyters:

'Neither as being lords over God's heritage, but being ensamples to the flock.'

Mr. Redfern's sermon as published in the press was a fine practical Christian utterance such as any Christian congregation would be glad to hear and be the better for hearing. We are sure that in issuing their invitation to a distinguished Christian preacher, the Liverpool Cathedral authorities did one of those courageous things which ought to be done but which so few of us have the courage to do. The distinction between Unitarian and Trinitarian is rapidly becoming a distinction of the past, and a higher synthesis of theological thinking is being reached in which both Unitarian and Trinitarian will be able to unite in Christian Faith and Fellowship. Meanwhile ecclesiastical protests which are unaware of this theological development are as inept as they are uncharitable.

WHAT WE OWE TO FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE AND HIS DISCIPLES

By the Very Reverend Dr. W. Moore Ede, Dean of Worcester.

THE reaction from the excesses of the French Revolution arrested all progress for twenty years. After the peace of 1815, dissatisfaction with things as they were, gathered strength. Politically it found expression in the Reform Bill of 1832, and later in the Chartist agitation. In religion it took the form of desire for new expressions in theology and in forms of worship. One of these revivals is known as the Tractarian, or Oxford Movement, and is associated with the names of Keble, Newman and Pusey; the other is associated with the name of another Oxford man, F. D. Maurice. These movements were contemporary, but entirely independent. The Tractarian movement had no connection with the Christian Socialists until the next generation, when under the influence of Charles Gore many connected with the Oxford Movement became members of the Christian Social Union. For that stirring of new life in the Church one hundred years ago, we thank God to-day.

I can best introduce what I desire to say about the great awakening by a story, never yet printed. When I was in the County of Durham I was very intimately connected with Bishop Westcott. In his contribution to Westcott's life, Thomas Burt, the first mining M.P., describes the relations between the Bishop and myself as resembling that of father and son. One evening when the Bishop was staying with me, as he often did, and we were chatting over the fire, I happened to say that I thought that the man who most profoundly influenced the thought of the Church of England was neither Keble, nor Newman, nor Pusey, but Frederick Denison Maurice. People did not realize this, because few of them read Maurice's writings, as he did not write in a popular style, but his ideas came to others through his disciples, such as Kingsley, and, I nearly added, yourself. To this Westcott replied, 'I am surprised at what you say, but perhaps I am not a fair judge; I never read Maurice.' 'What,' I exclaimed, 'you never read Maurice?' 'No,' said Westcott. 'I did read one thing he wrote, and I purposely never read any

more, for I felt that his way of thinking was so like my own that if I read much of Maurice I should endanger my originality.' 'Well,' I said, 'I think I ought to tell you the one complaint your friends make about you is that you never acknowledge your indebtedness to Maurice.'

How can we account for the resemblance of the theological ideas of these two contemporaries? The reason is that they both of them drew their inspiration from St. John, both wrote commentaries on the Fourth Gospel, and under the influence of Johanine thought they both regarded the Incarnation as the central fact in the life of the world, the fact that the Word, the Mind, and the Thought of God became flesh and tabernacled among us full of grace and truth. What I said to Westcott that evening I wish to repeat, that though Churchmen owe much to the leaders of what is called the Oxford Movement, I believe the man who most influenced the thought of the Church of England in the nineteenth century was Frederick Denison Maurice, and for the following reasons.

Maurice was born in 1805. His father was a Unitarian Minister, and his family, conscious of the separation from other people which that fact entailed, turned their remarkably keen intellects to the discussion of the intellectual basis of Christianity. Thus, from his youth up Maurice was accustomed to controversy and was a keen seeker after fundamental truths.

In October, 1823, he went to Cambridge University. The little shy student made his mark at Cambridge, as he did wherever he was through life, by his intellectual sincerity and his personal charm. Hallam, writing to Gladstone, said : 'The effect he has produced on the minds of many at Cambridge by the creation of the Society of Apostles, for the spirit of that society was created by him, is far greater than I can dare calculate, and will be felt both directly and indirectly in the age that is upon us.'

He gained a First Class in Civil Law and was awarded two Scholarships, but he never took his Degree or received money from his Scholarships, because such honours were then confined to members of the Church of England, and Maurice, though much drawn to that Church, could not say he was a member. A friend who knew he was tending to the Church of England, suggested he should wait, that in a short time he probably would

have decided to join. To this suggestion Maurice indignantly replied, 'Take my name off at once. I will not hang a bribe round my neck to lead my conscience.' So he left Cambridge without a degree and took up literary work in London.

In 1829 he went to Oxford, and shortly after he entered into residence at Exeter College he was baptized. He was in Oxford at the beginning of the Tractarian Movement. He was there when Keble preached his celebrated sermon on National Apostacy, and when Newman wrote 'Tract 90.' Tractarians at first thought Maurice would become a member of their party, because a pamphlet he had written on 'Subscription no Bondage' seemed to advocate liberty in the interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles, and it was proposed to bring him back to Oxford by voting for his election as Professor of Political Economy.

At this time Pusey published a Tract on Baptism which stirred Maurice deeply. It cut at the very basis of his creed, which was the conviction that God is a father with whom men are in living communion. According to Maurice, religion was man's movement toward God only because it was also God's movement toward man. Because of this he regarded the spiritual possibilities of humanity as immeasurable.

Maurice said that if Pusey's view of baptism were true he might as well leave off preaching. Pusey contended that a child was made a child of God at baptism, whereas Maurice, in the light of the Incarnation, regarded man's relation to God as that of a child to a father, and that all, whether baptized or unbaptized, are God's children. Baptism therefore does not change a child's nature but declares a relationship which already exists. Moreover, the fact that the Word became flesh gives a sanctity to mankind. The Word could not enter into and become one with a degraded fallen being, nor could such being have the Divine Light in him. 'The light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world.'

The central position which Maurice assigned to the Incarnation, involved a definite separation from the theology of the great mass of Christians which in the early part of the nineteenth century started from the Fall, and made their interpretations of the Atonement central. Man was regarded as a fallen being to whom God cannot be reconciled because his human nature is depraved,

and God can only forgive men and receive them in friendship when they believe the wrath of God is propitiated by the sufferings of the Son, and when they, by belief in this, feel they are restored to friendship with God. Against such a view, Maurice contended that the Incarnation reveals not a depraved but a Divine humanity.

Maurice, speaking for himself, says : 'I was led to ask myself what a Gospel to mankind must be, whether it must not have some other ground than the fall of Adam and the sinful nature of man.' Maurice does not formulate his views about the Incarnation in a few dogmatic phrases; that was not his way. His leading thoughts permeated all he said and did. The Tractarians sought Catholicity in the revival of the past, and the Evangelicals in the unity of the converted. But neither satisfied Maurice. He sought for unison in Christ, in his own words : 'I have endeavoured in my Tracts to prove that if Christ be really the head of every man, and if He really have taken human flesh, there is ground for a universal fellowship among men (a fellowship that is itself the foundation of those particular fellowships of the nation, and of the family, which I also consider sacred). I have maintained that it is the business of a Church to assert this ground of universal fellowship; that I ought to make men understand and feel how possible it is for men as men to fraternize in Christ; how impossible it is to fraternize except in Him. Now the denial of a universal head is practically the denial of all communion in society.'

Few to-day realize how the theology which started from human depravity prevailed at that time. I am old enough to remember how crude theories of the Atonement dominated popular theology, and can recall many weary hours in which I wrestled with the doctrine of the Fall, as commonly expounded, which I felt to be untrue, but from which I could see no way of escape till I came under the influence of those who had themselves been influenced by Maurice. Before I pass on to speak about the way in which Maurice shifted the centre of theological thought from the Atonement to the Incarnation, I would like to explain how this comparatively obscure man, a country curate, a chaplain at a London hospital, a professor at King's College, which was not then a very prominent institution, a man who never held any

prominent ecclesiastical post, really changed the thought of the Church and gave a new outlook. He was no party man. Beneath the divisions of the Churches he saw the deeper unities of Christian truth and life, the one Fatherhood of God, the one brotherhood of man; the summing up of all humanity in Christ. 'In Him was life, and the life was the light of men' are the words which express his fundamental conviction.

The religious newspapers could not understand a man who belonged to no party, who went to fundamentals that lay beneath their party shibboleths. Consequently all the religious papers vilified Maurice in a most unchristian manner.

It was Maurice's sincerity combined with modesty which made such an immense impression on all who came in contact with him; also by his letters he influenced the leading thoughtful men of his time. They looked up to Maurice as the master and the prophet. I can understand it, for I knew Maurice, attended his lectures at Cambridge, sometimes went to hear him preach, when Edward Carpenter, who was then acting as his curate, read the prayers. I also went with a few others to his house to listen to him expounding moral philosophy. I can see him now, with that marvellous and most saint-like face, as he used to come into the room and go to his seat at the head of the table.

How Maurice exercised so much influence does not matter; that he did so is a fact, and by his influence changed for thousands the theological centre from the Cross to the Cradle.

It is to Maurice that we also owe a very remarkable change in the interpretation of the idea of Eternal Life from one of mere duration to one of quality.

In 1853 he published his theological essays, in one of which he discussed the meaning of 'eternal,' and pointed out that the use of the word 'eternal' did not in the New Testament always refer to duration, but to the character and quality of life, as is plain from the words of St. John xvii, 3: 'And this is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.' Maurice's teaching ran counter to the popular ideas about everlasting punishment and the endless fires of hell. Dr. Jelf, the Principal of King's College, brought the essay to the notice of the Council, who passed the following resolution:

> 'Because the opinions set forth and the doubts expressed as to certain points of belief regarding the future punishment of the wicked and the final issue of the Day of Judgment are of dangerous tendency and calculated to unsettle the minds of the students of King's College, therefore his continuance as one of its professors would be seriously detrimental to its usefulness.'

We find it difficult to conceive that able and Christian men should have acted in this way; if it is inconceivable to us it is because of the fight Maurice fought and the cogency of his arguments, and the way in which in a few years many came to accept his view.

But it is as an inspirer of the Christian Socialist Movement that Maurice's name is most frequently associated.

In 1852 industrial conditions were in a very terrible state, and among other things a great strike had recently failed and produced much misery. Several men, among whom were Maurice, Kingsley, Ludlow, Van Sittart Neale, Tom Hughes, and others, met and discussed what they, as Christian men, should do. They realised that their knowledge of God as known to them through the Incarnation, demanded that they should endeavour to meet political and social ills by applying Christ's principles to the problems which were exercising men. 'The time has come,' said Maurice, 'for us to declare that competition is not the law of the universe, and for us to declare by word and deed that it is a lie.' They got into touch with some working men, had many conferences with them, and decided that they must try to remedy the evils which resulted from godless competition by the Christian principle of co-operation. They preached that gospel by pamphlets, books, tracts, and speeches, and eventually started co-operative workshops, and devoted much time and money to these ventures. Owing to various causes, the chief of which was that the men were not sufficiently educated to rise to a higher form of industrial organization, these co-operative workshops did not prove permanently successful, but their effort to bring the teaching of Christ into political and business life had far-reaching influences. When they began their campaign, the idea that religion was in any way concerned with politics or social conditions was regarded as monstrous, and clergy who held such views were treated as not really Christians and regarded as beyond the pale. Kingsley was for a long time excluded from the pulpits of the

parish churches. If we to-day recognize that the Christian Faith is concerned with all the relations of life, and if we agree with Westcott in regarding the Incarnation as the revelation of Christian duties, the ground was broken and the way prepared by Maurice's band of Christian Socialists.

I have not time to describe how, when the co-operative workshops failed, Maurice and his friends turned to education and founded a Working Men's College, believing that by education they might prepare men for a higher conception of life and desire for a nobler social order.

We thank God to-day for the work accomplished through the Oxford Movement of one hundred years ago, but I think I have indicated the opinion I expressed to Westcott, that side by side with the Tractarian Movement there was another movement which went deeper and had greater influence on the theology of English Christians, and that movement was associated with the personality of F. D. Maurice. Through him the Incarnation came to be regarded as the centre of Christian Faith; through him we were also brought back to a truer understanding of Eternal Life; and through him Churchmen came to realize that a belief in the Word made flesh involves the application of the teaching of Christ to all phases of human relationships and activities.

Among all the Churchmen who lived a century ago, Maurice seems to me as incomparably the greatest, alike in life, in vision and in achievement. It has been well said that no words can more exactly describe his mission than those of St. John: 'A man sent from God . . . the same came for a witness to bear witness to the Light,' and in his time the Light was shining in a dark place. In these days, when the idols of our grandfathers are being thrown irreverently from their pedestals, he almost alone holds his place secure, and attracts to him wider circles of disciples. And not the least proof of his quality is this, that he stands as a test of his contemporaries; by their attitude to him we can, with remarkable accuracy, determine their true and abiding worth. Maurice's work, the causes to which he gave his life, Christian Socialism, the higher education of women and of the working classes, and, above all, the reinterpretation of theology in the terms of the Fourth Gospel—these, in all of which he was

a pioneer, live and increase to-day. He was a prophet, and in his own generation received the prophet's reward of vilification and persecution. It is our task in connection with this centenary to recall the memory of the noblest saint, the deepest thinker, the profoundest theologian who of all those who lived a hundred years ago most deeply influenced the thoughts of Churchmen, and to thank God to-day for the life and work of Frederick Denison Maurice.

ADDENDUM TO THE DEAN OF WORCESTER'S ARTICLE.

In the autumn of 1900 I stayed for a week at Bishop Auckland with Bishop Westcott, and at the end went on for a visit to Dr. A. S. Farrar, Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham. He told me that he and Westcott had been associated for fifteen years as Examining Chaplains to Bishop Magee at Peterborough, and that on one occasion Westcott had said to him:

> 'I am reading a German book on Duns Scotus' view of the Incarnation. Have you ever paid any attention to him and considered the question?'
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> 'I replied' (said Farrar to me) 'Yes, years ago.'
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> 'Westcott said, What do you think of it?'
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> 'I said, I am fascinated by it; I think it most suggestive and wish to believe it true.'
>
> Farrar continued: 'Westcott then became excited with delight and said, I am delighted to hear you say so. I can find *no one* who thinks so.'
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> 'I then said to him, But I cannot make Duns Scotus square with St. Paul. Aquinas seems to express St. Paul.'
>
> 'Westcott paused, and after thought for a moment or two said, Duns Scotus does embody the ideas of St. John.'

It was during the same visit that Dr. Farrar, in giving me advice about my own reading (after relating the story of Dr. Routh's advice to 'my old friend Burgon'), told me that Wescott's Commentary on I St. John shows how he thought St. John was illustrated and illumined by Duns Scotus; and that the emphasis which in later life Westcott laid on the varied aspects of the Incarnation as the Key to the Riddle of Existence 'was stimulated' (Dr. Farrar's expression) by the suggestions of the old fourteenth century school author and philosopher.

I said something to Farrar coupling together the names of Westcott and Maurice; but Farrar said:

> 'No, no. If you wish to find someone to whom Westcott is kin you must go to Whichcote, a seventeenth century divine of whom he has written an interesting little brochure, and long before him there was the illustrious Origen — in these two, ancient and modern, you find the same general feeling. . . .'

This *obiter dictum* of Farrar's seems to me worthy of preservation:

> 'Really, my dear fellow,' (Farrar's usual opening of his vocative in conversation) 'Westcott is possessed of encyclopaedic knowledge and his place is alongside of Scaliger.'

R. R. Verity,
Vicar of Norton and Chaplain of Norton Barracks.

GROUNDS OF BELIEF

By S. L. Bethell, M.A.

MOST problems are ultimately epistemological, concerned, that is, with the manner and validity of our knowing. Of this an interesting example is the new civilization of Russia, built with Russian consistency on the basis of dialectical materialism and referring back in all its details to that basis. Once grant the primary assumptions of Marxism and the system is invulnerable: to every objector the Marxist has a ready and consistent answer. In this respect Roman Catholicism is similar: grant the infallibility of the Pope, and your Roman apologist is at ease; grant the materialist basis of history, and you are inevitably swept into Communism. To-day, Communism and Roman Catholicism seem to divide the world between them: they are the only firm, assured creeds in the flux of modern thinking, and quite naturally the weary, over-taxed with self-determination, seek rest with one or the other, thankfully surrendering an autonomy of mind which has only produced unsettlement, and which would seem to end in scepticism, cynical and inert. For a time such scepticism was the fashion in 'intellectual circles,' but events have moved quickly in the last few years, so that even the 'intellectual' feels the need to be up and doing.

It is significant, however, that both these creeds, whose solidity appears unshaken before the world, rest on discredited assumptions: too often a corpus of belief displays astonishing activity long after it should have been decently interred; to vary the metaphor, it is the cast-offs of the schools that the people joyfully receive as new garments. The strength of Romanism and of Communism lies in the ability of their exponents to disregard the weight of argument against them, and to carry their adherents with them by an appeal to their obvious efficiency in practical life.

But an efficiency is dearly bought which ranks orthodoxy above the truth, and there is somewhat of hardness in each of these creeds, of aloofness from men's real needs, which must finally reveal them as inept. Meanwhile, the world without these

opposing fortresses of faith is in a quandary. The twentieth century has seen the dissolution of most beliefs, and the multifarious efforts of reconstruction are more ingenious than convincing. Faced with Lawrence, Spengler, Chestov, what are we to think? Or, presumably, we are not to think at all. The world, the thinking world, is crazy with its thinking: the soul, or whatever it is, is adrift on the sea of its own imagining: the universe, if universe it be, has been emptied of all meaning and of all value, and is become a nightmare world where reason cannot apply. This would not be a serious matter if only the 'thinkers' were thus affected; thinkers may be allowed their crotchets. But the pseudo-thinkers have caught the contagion, and it is the pseudo-thinkers who run our dailies and control the cinema, so that meaning and value (which once existed crudely sentimentalized in the old romance or melodrama) have been strained out of the fodder which feeds the mass-produced mass mind. In the face of a situation so unprecedented and appalling, it is a little premature to sing alleluias to the God of Newman and otherwise expand our Christian souls in self-gratulatory exercise.

The Church of England, if it is not to fail completely in its stewardship, must present, and must present soon, a reasonable body of Christian belief to the world. It is insufficient to present a programme, as has been done very ably in *Christianity and the Crisis*: it must furnish reasons why the programme ought to be carried out, a fundamental substantiation of the Christian faith. And it is here that the epistemic problem enters. For better or worse the Church of England has no accredited philosophy, no Aquinas or Marx to whom metaphysic questionings may be referred: on the one hand, this assures flexibility and leaves her open to a deeper sensitiveness to current needs; but, on the other, it makes co-ordinated teaching difficult, and lays her open to a constant charge of unpreparedness. Also it has always meant the adoption of the prevailing philosophy, or philosophical attitude, of the time, more or less modified for consistency with the Christian revelation. This has been a grave weakness which we might do well to consider more fully.

During the greater part of the seventeenth century the new spirit of philosophic individualism made little impression on the Church, which continued to wrangle over secondary doctrines and to class all the new philosophers together as atheists, only

making use of their names from time to time as derogatory epithets to fling at an opponent (*e.g.* a Roman Catholic divine in a pamphlet issued in 1688 at Oxford accuses Cranmer of 'most damnable Hobbism'!) Then the Deists emerged and gained headway in quite fashionable quarters, so that the Church felt herself forced, in the first half of the eighteenth century, to reply. This she did in terms so similar to the Deists' as almost to evacuate the Holy Spirit for the next hundred years from the company of orthodox believers. The Deistic controversy is an ample warning against any return to the 'high *a priori* road': Rationalism has been dead since Hume.

It is to be feared that a similar error of judgment has led the Church astray in her controversy, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with what has been called scientific humanism. Modernism (for it is impossible to regard the Oxford Movement as producing a philosophy at all) too readily took over that superstitious regard for the Evolution Theory which characterized her non-Christian opponents. It was too hastily assumed that miracles must be hushed up, and that *natura non facit saltum*. Spencerian optimism grew popular within the Church, and the biological ascent of man became confused with a notion of moral ascent which the facts of history and modern anthropology seem scarcely to bear out. Optimism is difficult in this year of grace, and even science seems to have deserted us, and modestly refuses to endorse the suppositions her findings had suggested.

How, then, are we to stablish our faith? Not, as we have said, on the basis of Rationalism: innate ideas have vanished into sense; the Pure Reason is indeed pure from the world, and a system of abstractive concepts cannot lead us to Reality. Pragmatism, which asks 'Does it work?'—that typically American product—can lead us nowhere. Before we can say whether it works or not, we must know what we want to work towards: a belief may work, may produce 'a good citizen,' and yet be wholly wrong: how, if we know not the meaning of the universe, can we know the good citizen from the bad, the belief that works good from that which works destruction? It would be impossible in the short space of this article to consider separately the various theories of knowledge which have been advanced; it is sufficient to say that the classical theories have been unques

tionably confuted by Dr. Tennant (*Phil. Theol.*, Vol I), whose own variety of Empiricism seems the least exceptionable of all, and indeed the only fruitful method of procedure in the field of strictly Natural Theology. Natural Theology, however, has little to say of the distinctive doctrines of Christianity; by its very nature it ignores the specifically Christian revelation (whatever we may mean by that phrase), and it is impossible not to regard with trepidation any attempt to rest theology as a whole on the finding of the natural sciences, whose hypotheses are so constantly changing and whose scope is necessarily limited to the phenomenal world. The appeal, however, to the 'religious consciousness' is even more fraught with danger, whether it take the form of Ottoesque assertion of the numinous, or, with James and his disciples, stresses the experience of the mystics. Experiences of either kind are essentially private and incommunicable, and hitherto their claim to uniqueness and immediacy has failed to satisfy the psychologist or philosopher (*vide* Tennant, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Cap. 12). Furthermore, any attempt to safeguard religion (for this it often seems to be, rather than impartial inquiry into facts) by appeal to uniqueness of *data*, carries with it the disadvantage of removing religion from that contact with the world of every day, and the moral values inherent therein, without which it loses its chief significance. Christianity supplanted the mystery religions of the Hellenic world for the sound reason that it had more than mysteries to offer, and a degradation of Christianity to their level must prove fatal. This appeal to the primitive, more fully evidenced in D. H. Lawrence, and but pallidly reflected within the Church (for this point *cf.* an article by the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, entitled 'The Light that Failed,' in the *Modern Churchman* for April-May, 1931), is one more sign of intellectual panic in the modern world: it has reached the masses through the medium of jazz music and dances copied from the *cultus* of Voodoo, but seems now in the face of economic crises to be on the wane.

Nor is history enough: we can appeal, it is true, to the historic facts of the life of Jesus—but what are the facts? Historical criticism is never impartial, but always coloured by the philosophical preconceptions of the age. Nearly a century and a half ago Paley could declare the purpose of Christ's coming to have been the revelation of a future state of rewards and punishments,

and the miracles to be the authenticators of His message: more recently, under the influence of scientific humanism, the miracles have been explained away. I am not concerned with the truth or falsity of either position, but merely to point out the inadequacy of historical *data* as the foundation of belief.

So far, the reader may complain with justice that confusion has been but worse confounded; yet I make no apology for dwelling so long in a list of negatives. The first and crying need of the Church to-day is to remove false optimism and those miasmic notions which continue to cloud the brain long after their day is done. We must 'see life steadily and see it whole.' We must appreciate the dignity of man and the nobility of Reason, but we must not be blind to the degradation of man, to the cruelty (Germany, India) and vice (white and black slavery) and greed (*e.g.* armaments' rings); the folly and superficiality (*e.g.* the cinema and the popular novel); the deadly, thoughtless conventionality and respectability (*e.g.* some professing Christians live in luxury while others starve; and divorce where there has been no real union is often considered immoral by the very people who see no immorality in a marriage contracted purely for worldly advantage—this latter might almost be classed as a superstition, for a formula in church for such minds is the guarantee of purity, like a label on margarine). I have given examples throughout that I may not be convicted of groundless misanthropy in reiterating that the ascent of man has been biological, not moral—'the ascent to man' would be a better phrase: it must be recognized, without any sneer, that an ignorant negro is often a better Christian, and thus a wiser man, than many a profound scholar in our own land.

Keeping such facts in view then, to assure that our thinking be concrete and relevant to the world of fact (as much that passes for philosophy is not), let us finally approach the question: What are the grounds of our belief? First of all, let us distinguish between two uses of the word 'believe': (*a*) to believe a fact, on evidence, and (*b*) to believe *in* a person. For example, in many detective stories the hero is believed on evidence to have committed a murder, but the heroine throughout believes him innocent, believes *in* him, declares that she *knows* he is incapable of such an act. The heroine, of course, is always right, and after the eighty-fifth administration of the same theme

the reader inclines to scoff. Yet life bears out this darling of the fiction-writer: if *A* knows only 'the facts of the case' but *B* knows the person concerned, in nine cases out of ten *B* is the better equipped for reaching the truth. What, then, is this knowledge which *B* has and *A* has not? If he were asked to explain his certitude that his friend were innocent he would probably just assert that he *knew*, repeat this many times, bluster and retire: a jury would laugh, but it would be wrong. *B's* knowledge is based on a long series of events which have gradually shown to him the character of *X* (his friend): most of these events, no doubt trivial in themselves, are forgotten, or linger only in the depths of the subconscious, but their effect, the conclusion to which they have led regarding the character of *X*, remains. If *B* is a sensible person, who really observes facts and does not simply endow *X* with a character of his own imagining—if, that is, he is a 'realist' and not a romantic—his evidence will be more valuable by far than the isolated collection of circumstances unearthed by *A*. It is not infallible, of course, but it is a good working knowledge, on which all men have to rely in daily intercourse with their fellows: when affection accompanies this belief it transmutes it into faith.

Now it is my contention that as is *B* to *X*, so is the religious genius, or the poet (I speak not of mystics or of experiences essentially characterized by mystical states of consciousness), to the Ground of the universe. The religious genius, or the true poet, feels himself to be in a personal relationship with whatever underlies the phenomenal universe; he knows this Being through his world, and (herein lies the essential difference from the mystic) the wider his discursive knowledge of the universe, the deeper his knowledge of men and things—the surer becomes his knowledge of the Being who is the source of them all. Familiarity with 'Nature,' with men, with books, with other religious thinkers, all contributes to establish more firmly his belief. Such a belief, by its nature, is not susceptible of proof in a legal or a logical sense, and yet, as we have shown by analogy, it may for that reason be the more certain. It is not that *data* are not present, but that they are present to the subconscious mind, and any attempt to fish them up into the conscious must partially fail. Think as we may, we cannot get all the facts which are really

present to us, and then to argue we must abstract from and conceptualise even the few facts we have obtained. Little wonder that a theological system is such a poor thing compared with the full message from which it starts! This is not to deny the functions of the reason: its findings, too, contribute to the general result, to the belief or faith which we achieve; we need our natural theologians and our systematic theologians — no good ever comes of scamping the brain-work and relying on a *lumen naturale*. But we must realize that they are not all, that they are, indeed, very remote from the true grounds of our belief; for everyone has to some extent this power of contemplating the universe personally: it is not, like the experience of the mystic, open only to a few, but to all who are not incurably frivolous or incurably enslaved by the immediate end.

The power varies greatly, however, between person and person: we are not all creative[1] to any degree. But we can all be receptive. We cannot all be poets, but we can all train ourselves or be trained to the appreciation of poetry. The same is true of religion — indeed, expressions of religious faith by a great and original mind are poetry: and the greatest poetry, inversely, is always the expression, directly or indirectly, of religious faith, of, that is, the soul's relation to the Ground of the universe. (This is a rash generalization and would need qualifying to be accurate, but more detailed treatment is impossible here: enough if the general relationship be felt to be true.) Theology has too long courted the sciences and modelled herself on them; she might more fruitfully have chosen the literary critic as her study. Scientific treatment, whether of philosophical or historical *data*, must be secondary. We must read the Gospels, and the works of great religious thinkers, as literature first, and in this way absorb their essence. To a serious reader—for the 'high seriousness' which Arnold commends is above all things necessary here — the truth perceived by others will illuminate his own experience, consistent with it but giving it fuller meaning, and will be appropriated as from then essentially his own, as a poem can enter and reshape our minds.

[1] 'Creative' is used of the systematisation of religious belief from the facts of the universe: it is a creation of the imagination, to be distinguished from a creation of the fancy, such as the romantic's false notion of his lady's worth.

THE GENTLENESS OF MARK PATTISON

By the Rev. HUBERT HANDLEY, M.A., formerly Vicar of St. Thomas's, Camden Town.

IT is a great honour to be allowed, even in a slight degree, to right a wrong. Mark Pattison's fame has been subject to a certain injustice; he is sometimes held to have been a grim, dry, unfeeling recluse—learned as you like, but crabbed and unapproachable. This fiction probably has a double origin: (1) his forbidding tone and gesture towards persons unknown or uncongenial to him—'a singularly stiff and freezing manner to strangers and to those whom he disliked' (*Dictionary of National Biography*, p. 507); (2) the widespread belief, true or false, that Pattison was sketched or parodied in the Edward Casaubon of *Middlemarch*—'in lighter but by no means light literature he was said to be the original of Edward Casaubon' (the *Guardian*, Feb. 6, 1914). False rumour, when once it has begun to spread, cannot be caught and stopped; but sometimes it may be checked in its extension by the narrative of a few plain facts.

I was under Mark Pattison as Rector of Lincoln College for nearly four years, from early 1872 to the end of 1875. The high table in Hall at that time gathered about it a distinguished group. The Rector sat at the head—*facile princeps*, easily Jove; though the minor divinities around were almost all, in varying degree, eminent. At the far end sat Thomas Fowler, Sub-Rector, afterwards President of Corpus; an authority on logic; perhaps best remembered by many of us from his unfailing, kindly messages borne regularly to every man in College, 'The Sub-Rector sends his compliments, and invites you to breakfast with him to-morrow morning.' There was W. W. Merry, with a flowing beard; later, Rector; of Homeric repute; affable, often to be seen chatting in quad with the men. W. Warde-Fowler was there; scholar, musician, friend of birds; a man most lovable, always the same. F. Metcalfe, translator of Becker's *Gallus* and *Charicles*, was there, though not then actively engaged in College; and lastly Washbourne West, the Bursar, a just old man—pacific if you paid your dues, formid-

able if you did not. There were perhaps others whom I forget.

'Mark Pat,' as we of the rank and file called him, was of course a familiar figure among us, though few of us had much personal intercourse with him. (The *Dictionary of National Biography* records that, though years before as Tutor he had 'excited the warmest affection on the part of his pupils,' as Rector 'he did not much concern himself with the College generally or with the undergraduates.') For us in the early '70's he was regularly seen not only, as noted above, in Hall, but also in Chapel at Morning Prayer on Sundays, when he usually read the Ante-Communion Service. He pronounced the word Apostolic — Apóstŏlic. On these occasions he never, to my regret, preached or spoke to us a word of guidance or exhortation. Yet what knowledge and capacity stood at that Lincoln altar! 'Christianity appeared made for nothing else but to be "proved"; what use to make of it when it was proved was not much thought about'; so Pattison had written in *Essays and Reviews* concerning the eighteenth century. What lessons he might have drawn for us in the later nineteenth century from that text! However, I do not presume to blame him for this reticence of his later years; I do not know what in this matter he may have deemed to be his own disabilities.

The Rector's appearance — his presence, air, manner — was of a certain austere and native dignity; there was unmistakable distinction; you could not take liberties with this man; even for us young observers the stoop spelt student, and the face spelt thinker; and the whole personality, though not inviting, was markedly to be respected. For the Rector, failing in many characteristics which at first sight are attractive to the young, possessed other qualities which to the undergraduate mind are ever root virtues — he was sincere, direct, completely free from clerical mannerisms, affectation, and pose, careless of popularity, one who, I think, we felt would be reliable at a pinch. If I tried in a few words to sum up the judgment of the juniors in the College on their Head, I should say: we were proud of him, we had an instinct that he was a big man, and that, though he might seem rather queer, he was all right. *The Times* expressed our dim thought when years after, on his death, it spoke of him as 'a master mind.'

But the title of this short paper is 'The Gentleness of Mark Pattison.' I have not seen any public testimony to this particular quality in his more private life; though L. A. Tollemache comes near to it when he writes of Pattison's 'sympathetic kindliness—a quality for which, among men at least, he had little credit' (*Recollections of Pattison*, p. 85). On the other hand, we have learned of various lighter graces in him not always associated with so massive a personality. For example: there was his beautiful knowledge and love of nature—'the ways of a mole or a kingfisher were almost as interesting to him as the studies of a Scaliger' (*The Times* obituary, July 31, 1884); his sly humour in recording that his Oriel Tutor on Aristotle was 'barely able to translate the Greek, even with the aid of a crib' (*Memoirs*, p. 183); his personal charm among his intimates—'some people didn't like Pattison, to me he was always a charming person' (William Stebbing, a former pupil, for many years a leader-writer for *The Times*, writing in that journal May 16, 1921). I come now to my own immediate topic—his gentleness. The merit, if any, of my evidence lies in the seclusion of the scene and in the artlessness and simplicity there of the Rector's bearing. It is on trivial occasions like these that a man discovers himself.

During my second term it became my duty, by succession, on a certain Sunday evening to read the Lessons in Chapel. This afflicted me with a nervous dread which I could not then explain and need not now describe. Students of psychology will understand better than I the phenomenon. But the anxiety haunted me, followed me about for a week or two before the ill-omened date; growing in vividness and forbiddingness till, within a few days of the obligation, it was marring my sleep and inducing what may, without exaggeration, be called mental distress. What should I do? On the Saturday evening, what should I do? To whom go for advice? I chose the Rector. I knew some other authorities of the College more intimately, but the Rector I chose. There must have been within me some hidden confidence in some hidden humaneness within him, by which I was drawn to him. He received me, as I expected, rather ceremoniously: that was his way. But so soon as he found that I was, to some extent at least, in trouble, his tone changed, his

demeanour changed, and he became gentle, quietly concerned, and attentive. He listened; then, after a pause, he said in effect: 'Do not force yourself now to read the Lessons; I exempt you; forget all about the matter, if you can, and be free. But as to the future—this is important; you must read those Lessons next term without a shadow of doubt; meanwhile do not dwell on the subject; make now one steady resolve and, when the time comes, walk quietly to the lectern and do your duty.' I knew in a moment that the problem was solved; I did what the Rector bade me, and all went well. The gratitude and affection toward him which then sprang up has lasted for sixty years.[1]

There was another occasion when Mark Pattison was gentle to me. In 1876, after I had taken my B.A. and gone down, I wrote to him asking his advice on the old thread-bare perplexity which many men, desirous of Ordination, felt concerning assent to the Thirty-nine Articles. He invited me to talk over the matter with him. In his invitation he wrote down two principles which, though I published them many years ago, seem to be so wise and illuminating that I venture to cite them again: '1. A man must not put his hand to what he thinks untrue. 2. In joining any large association, general consent is all that can be expected. These two positions are, I think, the opposite poles between which a man has to find his own standing ground. Probably no two men stand on exactly the same square inch of ground.' But this second interview is recalled for the sake of the gentle patience with which in it the Rector listened to my embarrassments. My difficulties were not of a calibre to deserve his deliberation; they were too crude and unformed. Later they

[1] While respecting and admiring Mark Pattison, I ought to guard against false appearances on one point. He was not the type of religious thinker which I rank highest and which has most helped me through life. He depreciated and even, if I may say so with much diffidence, seemed to misunderstand 'the mystical element of religion.' He could not have written this, to me, religiously pregnant sentence of Carlyle: 'To *know*; to get into the truth of anything, is ever a mystic act—of which the best Logics can but babble on the surface'; nor this sentence of Martineau: 'In the very constitution of the human soul there is provision for an immediate apprehension of God'; nor whole large tracts, which to some among us reveal the very light of heaven, in the works of von Hügel. 'I was gradually drawn,' writes Pattison, 'out of Tractarianism . . . by the slow process of innutrition of the religious brain and development of the rational faculties' (*Memoirs*, p. 208).

grouped themselves around the two centres, Evolution and Biblical Criticism; but at that time they were loose and inconsequent, exactly of the sort, I fear, which might well vex the ears of a great scholar. The Rector was not vexed, he was conciliatory; he gave me some discerning and fatherly advice; then he did me the honour to read to me, in a forgiving and genial way, passages from the book with which he was engaged on my arrival.

Thus on two separate occasions was Mark Pattison gentle in his dealing with me; shewing to me in the first case, compassion, in the second case, patience. The compassion was, I think, the more gentle and the greater virtue of the two.

Lately I read, on the plain head-stone to the plain grave of Lord Morley in a London cemetery, this inscription:

'THE NOBLER A SOUL IS, THE MORE
OBJECTS OF COMPASSION IT HATH.'

What a test for us clergy! Not ecclesiastical, but human! A test defiant and evangelical to the core! The very test of Priest, Levite, and Samaritan, 'when he saw him, he had compassion on him'—never to be escaped! How in my Christian ministry have I stood that test? When from the parish some man in grief or sin came to me as a minister of Christ for succour, how did I receive him? Sometimes did I—too busy or thinking myself too busy—hurriedly, almost snappishly, put him off for a later visit, so that he went away merely puzzled or baffled? Or, by the grace of God, did I, even if immediately I could not allow much time to him, give him so quiet and genuine a welcome that in a moment he knew his distress was my affair and he got just a taste of the healing waters? But, you say, there are rogues: it is true, and it is an extraordinarily hard problem. Yet, which is the greater rogue: a thief just out of jail, or an uncompassionate clergyman? At any rate John Morley, from the grave—or rather, as I should say, from the other world—has nailed up the challenge to us before our eyes. The Rector of Lincoln in his own way and degree—in his own noble, jagged, difficult character—did, I believe, stand that test. Mark Pattison, if sometimes apparently gruff, yet behind the scenes and essentially was compassionate—as some of us will always remember.

'A DESPERADO THEOLOGY'

By the Rev. Samuel McComb, D.D.

SIR Edwyn Hoskyns has put the English-speaking theological world under a great debt of gratitude by his admirable translation of Professor Barth's exposition of the *Epistle to the Romans*,[1] a work which created on its first appearance in Germany a widespread conviction that a new epoch in religious thought had dawned. The difficulties with which the translator had to contend were by no means inconsiderable. It is not merely that the Professor writes German very much as Carlyle wrote English; that is that the categories of his thinking are alien to those of Anglican and Free Church divines. His passion for the transcendence, absoluteness and priority of God, his refusal to see in humanity any grounds of solidarity except that of common guilt, his contempt for delicate shades of meaning or for any view that seeks to mediate between opposed aspects of truth, his sharp antitheses and violent contrasts, his paradoxical, rhapsodical, subtle and sometimes obscure phrasing—all these characteristics make the book difficult to read, so difficult, indeed, that it is to be feared many will refuse to drive their minds through what must seem at times to be, in Dante's phrase, 'a rough, wild, impenetrable wood.' The truth is, we are listening not to a calm, logical unfolding of the Apostle's thought, supported by philological and linguistic erudition, but to the powerful, if gloomy, declamation of a prophet who seeks to stir the conscience and awaken the religious insight of his contemporaries. Dr. Barth would probably say that we do not reach truth by ideas that are clear-cut and satisfying to the intellect, but that, face to face with reality, our reason must oscillate for ever between 'Yes' and 'No,' between contradictory theses behind which the truth lies concealed. Even the most convinced modernist must acknowledge that here is a book, torn as it were from the inmost soul of the author, and stamped with an almost painful sincerity. The overwhelming greatness and majesty of

[1] *The Epistle to the Romans*. By Karl Barth. Translated by Edwyn C. Hoskyns, Bart., M.A. (Oxford University Press, 1933; 15/-.)

God have laid their spell upon his heart and mind, and for him the world is nothing and God is everything. Hence it is that we have here the creation of a prophetic mind, interested first and foremost, not in a careful and balanced exposition of Pauline ideas, but in a dramatic, almost cinematographic, flashing of certain lofty conceptions on the mind of the reader. In a word, St. Paul becomes a vehicle for the transmission of a message sorely needed, as Dr. Barth believes, for this generation. We need not therefore be surprised to find that he does not differentiate the elements that lie at the circumference of the Apostle's thinking from those that belong to its heart and centre. All the teaching of the Epistle is on the same level and bears the same authority. And this *doctrinaire* theory of inspiration leads him to quote the Old Testament as if it were equal, as a divine revelation, to the New. What then is the message which he finds in the Epistle? First of all as to God. He is not content with asserting, with the Apostle, His priority and incomprehensibility. No; for him God is the Unknown, the great *Incognito* :

> 'The Gospel comes to tell us that He is "wholly other" than man, so that there is no analogy between God's being and man's. The Gospel proclaims a God utterly distinct from men. Salvation comes to them from Him, because they are, as men, incapable of knowing Him, and because they have no right to claim anything from Him' (p. 28).

What about the revelation of God in Nature and in the souls of men? There is no such thing :

> 'God is the unknown God, and precisely, because He is unknown, He bestows life and truth and all things. Therefore the power of God can be detected neither in the world of Nature nor in the souls of men' p. 36).

And again :

> 'God who is distinguished qualitatively from men and from anything human, and must never be identified with anything which we name or experience or conceive or worship as God; God who is the First and the Last, and consequently the Unknown, who is never a known thing in the midst of other known things; God the Lord, the Creator, the Redeemer — this is the living God' (p. 331).

In using such words, is not Dr. Barth perilously near Deism? And if God and man stand ever against each other as alien beings deprived of all community of nature, how is the gulf between them to be spanned? And what becomes of the Incarnation? — the sum and substance of the Gospel message. It is not

too much to say that if Dr. Barth be right, the best theology of our time must be condemned as a hopeless and misleading attempt to justify the ways of God to man. As might be expected, such a doctrine of God leads to a harsh judgment on men. Man is depraved, a child of wrath, and lies under the Divine condemnation:

> 'Even the noblest of human moral and spiritual attainments are seen to be what they really are—natural, of this world, profane and materialistic' (p. 77).

He does not actually formulate a doctrine of total depravity, but he uses language which almost amounts to it:

> 'If all the great, outstanding figures of history whose judgments are worthy of consideration, if all the prophets, psalmists, philosophers, Fathers of the Church, Reformers, poets, artists were asked their opinion, would one of them assert that men were good or even capable of good?' (p. 85).

Has Dr. Barth never read that word of St. Paul that 'man is the image and glory of God'? Or that other word of a psalmist adopted by a New Testament writer: 'Thou madest him a little lower than the angels; Thou crownest him with glory and honour'? Did not Chrysostom say that 'the true Shekinah is man'—the manifested presence of God? And Browning, when asked his opinion, replies that man 'is a god in germ, far removed from brute.' The truth is that, bad as man is—and the Great War showed to what depths of devilish iniquity he could sink—he is not as bad as Dr. Barth paints him. For after all in man as man there is both a logical and a moral conscience, the one calling upon him to search for truth, the other imposing on him an ideal of goodness. Whence came those ideals? If there is one thing certain about the human soul it is that it does not create its own inspirations; they are the voice of the indwelling God. Maurice's contention is true to a reasonable view of human history:

> 'The whole history shows me that just so far as the true God has made Himself manifest, just so far has there been light, truth and honesty in the world, and that in those nations in which He is not revealed there is darkness, falsehood and fraud. I believe, therefore, that all the honesty and truth in the world has come from God, being manifested in the hearts of some men, and from thence affecting the general course of society' (*Life of F. D. Maurice*, Vol. II, p. 329).

Dr. Barth speaks much of 'the natural man' of whom he can predicate no good. But where is 'the natural man'? And what

is he? He is a mere abstraction called into existence by the imagination ignoring the divine elements in the actual man, and he has never had any flesh and blood existence anywhere. Very significant is it that when Christ speaks of conversion, He interprets it 'reversion,' a return to the simplicity and humility of an earlier state. 'Except ye be converted and become as little children ye cannot enter the Kingdom of God.'

It is curious to find Dr. Barth reviving a theory of revelation which in England received its death-blow in the controversy that raged round Mansel's Bampton Lectures nearly a century ago. As in Mansel's view there was no inner bond between man and God, no likeness amid the unlikeness of the human and the divine, any revelation of God to man could only be mechanical and external, coercing man by its very transcendence. And this appears to be the teaching of Dr. Barth. God can only break through the prison of man's purely natural life by a miraculous act which is absolutely inexplicable. Suddenly the 'No' which has faced man as an insurmountable barrier to his knowledge of God becomes a 'YES.' The Unknown God makes Himself known to a creature who yet does not share in the divine nature and to whom, therefore, the revelation must appear as something foreign to his actual being. If there is no spiritual unity beneath the discord of man's nature and God's, no real revelation is possible; morality and religion become alike impossible.

We need go no further with our examination of this book. The author's pessimistic outlook upon man and his spiritual history, his reaction against the sentimental humanitarianism which infected Victorian theology, his preoccupation with a world ravaged by the horrors of war, are the transitory causes of its appearance. But with the emergence of the world from spiritual confusion we may hope that saner views of God and of His relations to its unhappy inhabitants will prevail—even in Germany.

THE DANGER OF RESERVE

THE following passage, of great interest and importance for all teachers of religious truth, occurs in Dr. Albert Schweitzer's recently published Autobiography:

> 'The satisfaction which I could not help feeling at having solved so many historical riddles about the existence of Jesus, was accompanied by the painful consciousness that this new knowledge in the realm of history would mean unrest and difficulty for Christian piety. I comforted myself, however, with words of S. Paul's which had been familiar to me from childhood: "We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth" (II *Cor.*, xiii, 8). Since the essential nature of the spiritual is truth, every new truth means ultimately something won. Truth is under all circumstances more valuable than non-truth, and this must apply to truth in the realm of history as to other kinds of truth. Even if it comes in a guise which piety finds strange and at first makes difficulties for her, the final result can never mean injury: it can only mean greater depth. Religion has, therefore, no reason for trying to avoid coming to terms with historical truth.'[1]

The thought of the possible 'unrest and difficulty for Christian piety' occasioned by new discoveries in Biblical criticism has given anxiety to many an investigator. Critics as a class are by no means of the 'ruthless, relentless and remorseless' order. Some, it may be, are of this sort — cold and unfeeling, strident and merciless.

> We will speak out, we will be heard,
> Though all earth's systems crack;
> We will not bate a single word,
> Nor take a letter back.

These aggressive iconoclasts, who are more interested in smashing idols than in replacing them by something better, and care not if they fling many a *lapis offensionis* in the pathway of weary feet, deserve the worst that is said of them. The late Sir William Robertson Nicoll must have been thinking of this sort when he said, with a touch of grim humour:

> 'I am not at all sure but that heretics ought to be burnt. I mean the fellows who make a big row and split their churches.'[2]

But most of those who are engaged in critical research have a sincere sympathy with the weaker brother, and are by no means

[1] *My Life and Thought*, p. 65.
[2] *Life and Letters*, p. 160.

happy at the prospect of unsettling his mind and upsetting his faith. On the one hand, they feel it their duty to

> Seek the truth whate'er it be,
> And follow wheresoe'er it leads,

on the other hand the thought of the 'little ones' of Christ's flock is ever before them. What then are they to do, as between the claims of what they believe to be the truth, and the claims of those who will be distressed and hurt if the truth is promulgated? This is a practical problem not only for Biblical critics, but still more for those in the rank and file of the ministry who seek to mediate the results of research to their congregations.

One of these latter, a parish clergyman who relates in a recent book how he thought himself through from conventional orthodoxy to a more rational faith, thus states the problem as it presented itself to him in the early days of his intellectual pilgrimage:

> 'And yet there were all these simple souls . . . whose bewilderment and misery I could so plainly foresee if their childlike trust were rudely disturbed by careless hands.'[3]

It is a common experience, a familiar difficulty; and many there be who are puzzled as to the handling of it.

One thing is certain: mere suppression is never justified. The 'leave thou thy sister when she prays' attitude may be greatly overdone. Thomas Hardy, in the preface to *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*, quotes what he describes as 'a well-worn sentence of St. Jerome's':

> 'If an offence come out of the truth, better is it that the offence come than that the truth be concealed.'

Undoubtedly. We are suffering severely to-day because of the suppressions of past generations. The timid 'hush-hush' policy of the pulpit has left us a heritage of misgiving and mistrust which it will take a long time to remove. It is all very well to speak of consideration for the weaker brother. But so far from the weaker brother not having had consideration shown him, it might be argued that he has too long been allowed to set the pace in ecclesiastical matters. On this we may quote another passage from Dr. Schweitzer:

> 'How strong would Christian truth now stand in the world of to-day, if its relation to the truth in history were in every respect what

[3] A. F. Webling, *Something Beyond: A Life Story*, p. 168.

it should be! Instead of allowing this truth its rights, she treated it, whenever it caused her embarrassment ,in various ways, conscious or unconscious, but always by either evading, or twisting, or suppressing it. Instead of admitting that new elements towards which she had to advance were new, and justifying them by present action, she proceeded with artificial and disputable arguments to force them back into the past. To-day the condition of Christianity is such that hard struggles are now necessary to make possible that coming to terms with historical truth which has been so often missed in the past.'[4]

This is all too true, and many of our present difficulties — in the social and political realms as well as in the more technically religious sphere — are due to this fatal policy. Mere evasion, mere suppression, will simply never do.

What then of our old friend the 'doctrine of reserve'? Beyond question a very good case can be made out for it, at least in some of its forms. As for instance in the famous words of Bishop Butler:

'Men are impatient, and for precipitating things; but the Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout His operations, accomplishing His natural ends by slow successive steps.'[5]

There is a principle here which all wise teachers will observe. The new truths should dawn on the Church, and on the individual mind, as gently as the sunlight, and not with the shattering suddenness of lightning, and to ensure this necessitates reasonable caution, tact, 'reserve.'

Arnold of Rugby might have been right — probably was right — when he said, speaking of theological interpretation, that

'what men call "caution" in such matters is too often merely a selfish fear of getting oneself into trouble or ill-will.'[6]

We must not come under this condemnation, the cowardice of those who, as the judicious Hooker declares, basely through silence allow things to pass away as in a dream, and here every man must be the arbiter of his own attitude. The fear of personal consequences, if allowed to rule our procedure, is base. But the fear of consequences to others is on another footing. 'It is not enough to do good,' as Morley says in his *Compromise*; 'one must do it in a good way. No doubt we should destroy all errors, but . . . we should imitate a prudent architect who, obliged to

[4] *Op. Cit.*, p. 65.
[5] *Analogy*, ch. iv.
[6] Stanley's *Life of Arnold*, ch. ix (Letter 268).

destroy a building . . . sets about its demolition in such a way as to prevent its fall from being dangerous."[7] And this, in religious teaching, means a cautious sympathy in pointing out mistaken notions, and in introducing new ideas. 'Our Lord's tenderness about uprooting long-cherished convictions,' it has been well said, 'must never be lost sight of.'[8] There is a sweet reasonableness in these matters, a sound common-sense, which is consistent with the utmost loyalty to truth. And if this is what is meant by reserve in theological teaching, there is nothing to be said against it.

Archbishop Frederick Temple was once asked: 'Why do you not tell people in sermons that the current view on some subjects is not the true doctrine?' He replied:

> 'It would do more harm than good. The proper course is to preach sermons in which the true conception is presupposed, but not definitely stated; then people who think will find it out and be benefited, and those who do not think will not be uselessly disturbed.'[9]

Such 'reserve' as this — so stating truth, without blatancy or aggressiveness, that it makes its own appeal — involves not the least element of compromise, and would meet with few critics.

Schweitzer gives an amusing but instructive instance of the same principle. It concerns two professors of his acquaintance.

> 'Schwalbe was due to give a lecture on Anthropology to the Adult Education Society of an Alsatian town, and would of course have to mention the Darwinian theory. He told Schmiedeberg of his fear that he might give offence, when the latter replied: "Don't spare them! Tell them all about Darwinism, only take care not to use the word 'monkey,' and they'll be quite satisfied both with Darwin and with you." Schwalbe took the advice, and had the success that was promised.'[10]

But the trouble is that 'reserve' in religious teaching, however defensible in its more reasonable forms, shades off so insidiously into the suppression of truth. It has to be watched with the utmost care, lest a good thing become a bad thing. Was it not Dean Inge who said that

> 'in theology, as in practical politics, there is a great temptation to take a season ticket on the line of least resistance, and to call it statesmanship'?

Here is the danger, and that it is a very real danger is writ large

[7] Eversley Edition, p. 58.
[8] Latham, *The Risen Master*, p. 305.
[9] *Memoirs of Abp. Temple*, Vol. II, p. 708.
[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

in the history of the last two generations of religious thought in England, and in the present state of affairs. 'He had been a bishop so long,' says Mr. Galsworthy of a character in almost his last novel, 'that no one knew now what he thought about . . . anything.'[11] Such is the nemesis of statesmanship, caution, tact, diplomacy — by whatever name it may be called — and the tendency is by no means limited to bishops. Better completely abandon all attempts at reserve than risk so piteous a fate — a fate which means the end of all usefulness and influence for the Christian teacher, except the influence which shows itself in a harvest of tares for the next generation.

We come back to our starting point. The great reassurement for all who are anxious about the disturbing effect of the new ideas which they feel constrained to declare, is the striking and seldom-noticed statement of St. Paul which Schweitzer says was a comfort to him: 'We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth.' (Weymouth: 'We have no power against the truth, but only for the furtherance of the truth.') We believe, with the eminent missionary and scholar, that this passage will bear all the weight that may be laid upon it. If piety finds the new ideas strange, if at first they make difficulties for her, then, as Schweitzer says, 'the final result can never mean injury; it can only mean greater depth.'

We Christian teachers have to reckon with the apathy, dislike, or active opposition that greets new suggestions in the social and spiritual realms — in strange contrast to the eager welcome given to new scientific discoveries and inventions — and therefore must frankly recognize that the proclamation of more adequate conceptions of theological reality is bound to occasion unsettlement and distress in the minds of many. The late Grant Allen was once asked by his friend Edward Clodd to join him in some 'rationalist' propaganda. He refused on the ground that he deprecated the procedure involved, saying that he preferred to spread his ideas by 'slow half-truths.' Clodd replied that while he too deprecated 'the aggressive mood,' he considered that 'no battle for a great cause was ever won without hurting the feelings of many.'[12] The illustration is from the opposite

[11] *Flowering Wilderness*, p. 3.
[12] McCabe, *Edward Clodd, a Memoir*, p. 135.

camp, but that, of course, is immaterial. Clodd's dictum is incontrovertible, and the risk to which he refers must be accepted. It is inevitable, in the endeavour to replace old and outworn ideas by new and more adequate ones, that the feelings of those who cling to the old should be hurt.

However keenly we may regret this, it cannot be helped. And the great consolation is that, as Schweitzer says, 'the final result can never mean injury; it can only mean greater depth.' Those who are thus hurt can only be the better for the new ideas, even if they do not accept them, and even if they nurse their wounded feelings! They share mediately if not immediately in the effect of the fresh breezes that blow from the ever-advancing tide of truth, and profit indirectly if not directly from the resulting increased healthiness of the intellectual atmosphere. No one can really be harmed by new truth, however much he may be hurt by it.

Dr. Orchard, in his recent *apologia*, referring to 'the uncertainty and confusion wrought by the clamour of contradictory opinions and the launching of extravagant theories,' declares that the Roman Catholic policy of a Biblical Commission to settle disputed points, or at any rate to decide what shall or shall not be allowed to be taught, is 'infinitely preferable to the irresponsible individualism Protestantism has let loose.'[13] It is a very naïve statement of the case. We hold no brief for 'extravagant theories,' nor for

> 'The instinctive theorizing whence a fact
> Looks to the eye as the eye likes the look.'[14]

But Dr. Orchard must know, as everybody knows who is acquainted with history, that it is only by 'the clamour of contradictory opinions,' and by what he disingenuously describes as 'irresponsible individualism,' that progress has been made possible. This fear of the consequences of free and unfettered enquiry springs ultimately from a view of truth which argues distrust of it, lack of confidence in its inherent power to defend itself — as if it were a delicate plant that needs to be protected and safeguarded, and not a sturdy growth that is well able to withstand every gale of opposition, and thrives on all the attacks

[13] *From Faith to Faith*, p. 265.
[14] Browning, *The Ring and the Book*.

made upon it. It is a view which Milton's *Areopagitica*, with its glorious exposition of truth's sovereign invincibility, should have made for ever impossible; and it is a view which is poles asunder from the spirit of the robust declaration of St. Paul with which we have been concerned in this article.

We hold that the new ideas which are being introduced to-day in the fields of historical and psychological research will follow in the train of those which arose from fresh discoveries in astronomy and archaeology and geology and zoology in past years. The cry with which these were met, that the ark of God was in danger, is now seen to have been amazingly absurd. All these criticisms, it has been well said by a recent writer, 'religion has not merely withstood, but actually turned to profit, with a strange sort of persistent vitality.'[15] So it will be again—*must* be again, for 'we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth.'

Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. The Christian teacher should have for the master light of all his seeing that love of truth for its own sake, which is the fundamental principle of the genuine scientist, and which Lecky describes as 'perhaps the highest attribute of humanity.'[16] And therefore he will hold as his central conviction that truth is first and for ever to be sought and taught, be the consequences what they may. He will believe, with Whittier, in 'the safe appeal of Truth to Time.' And he will be confident, as the words of St. Paul to which Schweitzer alludes suggest, that such consequences can never be permanently antagonistic either to the general interests of truth as a whole, or to the highest well-being of any individual.

A. Garfield Curnow.

[15] Yellowlees, *Psychology's Defence of the Faith*, p. 16.
[16] *Rise and Influence of Rationalism*, Vol. I, p. 402.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE DEVELOPING GOSPEL*

Just as in modern English 'Gospel' connotes (*a*) the glad tidings of salvation through Jesus Christ and (*b*) a record of the life and teaching of the Saviour, so in the early church. Paul can speak of 'my gospel,' *i.e.* 'the Christian message which I preach' while Justin's well-known reference to 'the memoirs of the Apostles which are called Gospels' is clearly the written word. But it was only possible for second century usage to extend the originally univocal term to cover also the literary composition, because that literary composition was itself nothing if not the essentials of the current oral 'Gospel' preserved in more permanent form.

The intriguing process of development from the beginning till well into the second century is told, and well told, in the volumes under review. Dr. Mackinnon's emphasis is on the oral Gospel and Dean Grant's on the written: but between them the reader is guided from the earliest Christian preaching and from its simple, if shallow, apocalyptic message, into the deeper speculations of the first Fathers of the Church; and he is shown how, on the way, devout believers here, or theological geniuses there, have severally crystallized the 'tradition Gospel' of their local churches, or the 'speculation Gospel' of their own immediate circles, and combined to produce that 'quadriform Gospel,' which Irenaeus knew and taught.

The sub-title describes Profesor Mackinnon's book as 'a study of the Early Development of Christian thought,' while he himself in the Preface informs us that he uses 'the term "Gospel" as equivalent to Christianity, in its early form, as a proclamation or teaching which centres in Jesus Christ, the Revealer of God and the divinely ordained redeemer of mankind.'

So we are first introduced to the 'Primitive Gospel' of the Apostles: the sources used being certain passages of the Pauline Epistles, the Epistle of Peter, which 'if not written by him, undoubtedly contains echoes of the early apostolic preaching,' the Synoptic tradition (especially Mark), the Epistle of James, the Apocalypse, and the early chapters of Acts, which, though their author be often 'extremely credulous and also inexact,' nevertheless 'in substance give a reliable account both of events and the primitive teaching, which is too archaic to be invented.'

This chapter is followed by an exposition of 'The Pauline Gospel,' where 'the primitive Gospel undoubtedly underwent a development of a far-reaching character.' Paul 'not only develops, he creates'—and we gather that Professor Mackinnon is not very partial to the Pauline creations. The appeal of Paul's mysticism 'is less forcible for those whose faith is more tempered by reason' . . . '*they* prefer the teaching of Jesus.' . . . 'Jesus would probably have been as mystified as we are by this Pauline mystic adaptation of His teaching.' Paul's conception of the Law is 'one-sided' and in his controversies he would have been much more effective 'had he followed the example of the prophets and Jesus,' while 'his arbitrary method of treating the Old Testament history is by no means convincing.'

* *The Gospel in the Early Church.* By Prof. J. Mackinnon. (Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 1933. 16/- net.) *The Growth of the Gospels.* By Frederick C. Grant. (The Abingdon Press. 1933. $1.50.)

Our author has no doubt that Paul systematically distinguishes between God and Christ. Christ 'is not God in the absolute sense (θεός) or a second God, as in later theological speculation,' yet even so 'it is unfortunate that Paul, in his evaluation of the Christ, did not take more account of "the Christ after the flesh."' Thus we are not surprised to be asked why we should 'burden our faith with all that Paul, under the influence of contemporary thought, reads into his conception of the exalted Christ?' Paul is indeed the villain of the piece!

From this, the most controversial section of the book, we pass to 'The Subapostolic Gospel,' which is deduced from the remainder of the New Testament and so to 'The Gospel in the Early Fathers,' which treats of Clement, Ignatius, Barnabas, Hermas, the Didache and Papias. These sections are mainly 'introductions' to the literature with 'abstracts of their theology and so call for no special comment, save that the matter is sound, the views adopted well-balanced and the whole critically up-to-date.

In the concluding chapter Dr. Mackinnon restates as result his main thesis that 'the Gospel in the early church has undergone a process of development. This development reveals the influence of the individual apprehension of the teaching and person of Jesus, of the religious experience of the believer, and of the larger environment into which the Gospel ere long expanded.' The Gospel was not 'fully and finally proclaimed by Jesus,' but is a growth to which 'the Christian thought and experience of other minds besides His materially contributed.'

We note with approval the emphasis that the Primitive Gospel and Paul were both essentially Jewish, and that the Resurrection and Ascension narratives 'cannot be taken in the literal sense.' But on the other hand we doubt if it is quite so certain as the author seems to think (*a*) that Jesus conceived *Himself* as the suffering servant, and that the disciples in preaching Him as much were merely 'echoing the mind of the Master,' (*b*) that for Paul the Lord's Supper 'is *not* a sacrament in the sense of the mystery religions—a participation in the life of the deity,' or (*c*) that the Synoptic tradition 'remains substantially intact in its presentation of the life and teaching of Jesus.'

After a Preface describing the work of Gospel critics since the War, and showing how they have rendered the 'story-book' life of Christ impossible, Dean Grant takes as text 'The New Testament is the Church's Book' and plunges *in media res*.

The delay in the appearance of the Gospel and 'the form taken by the Gospels when they finally appeared are to be explained by the conditions, external and internal, of the early Christian movement.' Thus after a chapter on 'Method in the study of the Synoptic Gospels'—a piece of timely advice to the student, who is too often apt to begin anywhere but at the beginning—we pass to 'The Gospel before the Gospels.'

Here we learn that the conditions affected not only our existing Gospels but also 'the selection and formulation of the tradition in its earlier oral form, and in the earliest stage of writing, *i.e.* the compilation of the documents upon which the Gospels are based.' This is not theory but fact, for 'the materials themselves bear too patently the marks of purposeful selection and formulation.' And further, Dean Grant admits to be 'capable of general application' the principle 'that general laws prevail in the formulation and development of a tradition, so that it is possible by classifying the types of material thus handed down to amass them more or less in evolutionary sequence,' though he would hesitate to apply it in 'every case.'

Thus 'it is evident that the gospel tradition is ultimately resolvable into separate units of discourse, saying, narrative or the like.'

Accusations of arbitrariness and lack of foundation are often levelled at this type of criticism. It is gratifying, therefore, to find Dean Grant following Bultmann as against Dibelius and advocating the method of working 'backward from the finished Gospels to their underlying written sources, and then on this basis to construct a hypothesis of the oral tradition that preceded them.' Form criticism thus appears as the logical extension of literary criticism: 'the method grows out of the efforts at source analysis of the Gospels which have been characteristic of modern gospel study generally.' It is a pity that the author does not make more of this point, as it would go a long way towards disarming an ignorant popular prejudice. Bultmann himself, we may note, in his constructive vein (*e.g.* 'Jesus') makes no distinction between the two methods, but speaks simply of 'Critical Analysis.'

Form-criticism is no new toy invented for the delectation of cranks or the convenience of sceptics but the last, legitimate and necessary stage in Gospel criticism, whereby we can separate the earlier from the later traditions of the Lord. And even if we be forced to the uncomfortable truth that 'one can have no certainty that the words of the earliest layer of tradition were really spoken by Jesus' (Bultmann), it is not the method that we should attack but our own inadequate theologisings erected on bases that are demonstrably insecure.

Dean Grant next proceeds to an examination of the written sources. Q 'was a guide to catechists, a manual for the newly-converted, a statement of the Christian way of life—a handbook of "the Way."' L is faithful to 'the early Palestinian tradition on which it was based.' It is almost entirely free from the apocalyptic, eschatological element, and presents us with Jesus as 'a prophet who is almost something of a rabbi, a teacher, with a band of disciples who followed him.' But while Dean Grant is strongly convinced of the fundamental correctness of the Proto-Luke hypothesis, he is 'equally strongly unpersuaded of the existence of a document which Streeter labels "M" underlying the peculiar matter of Matthew.'

So Mark comes next. He did write 'in order' but his order was not as Papias supposed—it was never meant to be chronological, the arrangement was by subject. 'If only this single fact had been observed, the long reign of the Marcan hypothesis in Modern New Testament study would have been impossible, and Gospel research would be much farther advanced than it is at present.' Yet how unwilling are many to realise it.

Luke 'the Historian' probably gathered his material in Palestine and Syria early in the decade 70-80 and combined with it the major portion of Mark sometime in the seventies and issued his Gospel not later than 80-85. Matthew 'the Ecclesiastical Gospel,' a combination of Mark and Q with the local tradition of a northern Palestinian or Syrian church is to be dated sometime about the turn of the century.

The Fourth Gospel is treated satisfactorily from the religious-historical angle. John came from within the circle of early Christian Gnostic mystics: his Gospel is an 'attempt to rewrite the life of Christ from a point of view widespread in the Hellenistic world of his day': and his language is influenced by the 'hieratic' style common to the Hermetic, Mandaean and Philonic literature. Yet Dean Grant shows himself here, as elsewhere, a moderate. He will have none of Mandaean influence: such parallels as exist between John and Mandaeism but 'illustrate the common religious background of both Mandaean and Hellinistic Christian mysticism.' Neither

is he attracted by the Syrian origin for the Gospel advocated by modern critics. He sticks to Ephesus and the 'accepted' date.

As to details: it is perhaps disconcerting to find marvellous spelt with one l: ὤν spelt as ὦν: and Archdeacon Rawlinson repeatedly styled 'Professor.' However, it may be supposed that the 'English' spelling throughout is American.

Two good books. And improved by reading together.

HEDLEY F. D. SPARKS.

TRACTARIAN DAYS AND WAYS*

Of literature on the Tractarians, there would seem to be no end. Studies, histories, biographies, have flowed from the press with increasing profusion. No doubt the purpose of many of these publications is to create an optimism for extreme Anglo-Catholicism in the minds of their readers. It is this which gives to many of these propagandist efforts their exaggeration of style and their atmosphere of unreality.

The volumes before us do not partake of this nature. There is a certain liveliness about them which lends them a charm all their own and Dr. F. L. Cross has added a contribution of the greatest importance to the literature on Newman. He gives a study of Tractarian Oxford, a delightful picture still redolent of the eighteenth century, and calls attention to the weakness of Roman Catholicism in the Oxford of that day, and into this background he introduces the outstanding figure of John Henry Newman. Newman's personality outshines his contemporaries, and it may be fairly claimed that his learning was, in spite of his failure in the Schools at Oxford, of no mean order. His personality inspires others to differing emotions. In Dr. Cross he inspires respect. In Edwin Abbott he inspired repulsion.

Dr. Cross, in studying the essential moralism of Newman, has taken full advantage of the introduction afforded by the brilliant essay of Professor C. C. J. Webb. His Moralism lay at the root of his philosophy of life and it was the key to his whole interpretation of religion.

> 'When the soul comes face to face with God, it feels at once a sense of its moral worthlessness in the presence of the All-Holy. The moral law is brought before the soul, asserting its claims to unquestioning obedience and submission. The call of conscience is insistent, categorical, absolute. Herein is to be found the bed-rock of certainty for the religious man.'

The peculiar sense which the Tractarians gave to holiness explains much of Newman's ideals. For Newman, the ideal to be reached was 'to feel that the one thing which lies before us is to please God.'

Tract XC forms the turning point in Newman's career. When he came to write the *Apologia,* he found various reasons to explain his path to Rome—the Donatist controversy, the Arians, the Monophysites, and the rest. It is, however, fairly clear that, in reality, his secession was a psychological reaction from the opposition brought upon him by his publication of Tract XC. For the writing of Tract XC Newman undoubtedly deserves some thanks from modernists, for, by the bringing of the whole question of subscription into the arena, he undoubtedly helped forward that move-

* Lives of the Tractarians Series: *John Henry Newman,* by F. L. Cross; *John Keble,* by Kenneth Ingram; *Edward Bouverie Pusey,* by Leonard Prestige; *After the Tractarians,* by Marcus Donovan. (Philip Allan. 6/- net.) *The Eucharistic Doctrine of the Oxford Movement,* by W. H. Mackean. (Putnam. 6/- net.)

ment which in 1865 culminated in the imposition of more liberal terms of clerical subscription. It must, however, be acknowledged that the Tract, as the Four Tutors pointed out at the time, tended to obliterate the distinctions between England and Rome. When disappointment came to the author, the path to Rome was a *facilis descensus*.

The series of hitherto unpublished letters from Newman to Dr. Alfred Plummer form a valuable appendix to Dr. Cross' book, as does a chapter on Newman and the Vatican Council. There is also an interesting suggestion that the story which Newman gives in his *Apologia* that the Oxford Movement originated with Keble's Assize Sermon is a myth. Although we remain unconvinced, it must be conceded that Dr. Cross brings forward some interesting points, and a future historian of the Movement will have to weigh these points in the balance before committing himself to the July 14th theory. Altogether, it is a book which is as fascinating as it is important.

Mr. Ingram, writing from the standpoint of a liberal Anglo-Catholic, has achieved a penetrating study of Keble, and he is especially good in his estimation of the influence of Keble upon the Movement and the manner in which it was frequently the vicar of the quiet country parish of Hursley who was able to take the lead in a time of crisis. That Keble has a message for modern times, Mr. Ingram is convinced. He supported Sunday cricket in his village, he agreed with Gladstone that Jews should be admitted to parliament, he had a policy in ecclesiastical affairs. But his approach to religion was narrow, pedantic, and sacerdotal. When the broad-minded Dean Stanley invited him to preach at Westminster, Keble refused rather than preach from the same pulpit as F. D. Maurice. Mr. Ingram is forced to admit that Keble is 'unmodern' and belongs to a past age. With Keble, we are back again with the Non-Jurors. Except that he is the father of all traditionalists, good churchmen, and ecclesiastics battling against the perils of modern thought, it may be seriously doubted whether Keble has any message for the present age.

It is but rarely that the solitary and somewhat grim figure of Pusey affords scope for merriment, but Mr. Prestige takes the opportunity, *en passant*, of informing the world of his opinions on a multitude of subjects, from The Deposited Book of 1928, of which he disapproves, to Theological Liberalism, of which he likewise disapproves. Mr. Prestige should really be more sure of his ground. He is quite wrong in thinking that the adherents of Liberalism are hard put to it to 'square it with Anglicanism.' Liberals know that Anglicanism must be liberal or it must die. Liberalism is a spirit permeating and enlarging the scope of the religious approach to problems of life and death. In the event of a second edition of his book, may we beg Mr. Prestige to drop the inquisitional manner on pages 39 and 40 and to seek to accord some measure of justice to the memories of Dr. Arnold and the much-abused Dr. Hampden? Mr. Prestige has written an excellent life, based upon Liddon's huge biography of Pusey, but it is marred by its polemical tone.

The followers in a movement never have quite the same fascination as the leaders but the Rev. Marcus Donovan, on the basis of some reminiscences of Mr. Athelstan Riley, has written an interesting and readable volume on the Tractarian *epigonoi*. It is not free from party bias but it contains a vast amount of information concerning those whose memory is no longer as prominent as it once was. Canon McColl is once again called up to view, as is R. S. Hawker of Morwenstow. We are sorry to see little more than a passing reference to Stewart Headlam, whose gallantry and whose

services to education it would be difficult to over-estimate. Again, we are sorry to encounter a sneering remark about Dr. Barnes, though at the same time Mr. Donovan calls attention to the broad charity of the famous Victorian Broad Churchman, H. R. Haweis, who invited Fr. Ignatius to preach in his church. Although the author is none too anxious to admit the point, he is forced to allow that modern Anglo-Catholicism contains within its ranks not a few who are affected by the Modernist approach to religion. Certainly, it would be interesting to know what such Tractarian diehards as Canon Liddon or Archdeacon Denison would have thought of Fr. Wilfred Knox's last book ! It has been the folly of the Church of England, as Newman pointed out in his famous sermon, 'The Parting of Friends,' to be unable to use the gifts of some of her greatest sons. This book will have achieved a good purpose if it does no more than recall the ecclesiastical tragedies of Dolling and Stanton, and the relegating of the able Charles Marson to an obscure country living.

The study by Canon Mackean of Tractarian Eucharistic Doctrine is a most important contribution to sound learning and theological science. Starting with the Non-Jurors, he traces the development of high Eucharistic doctrine and shows how the Tractarian conception of the Eucharistic Sacrifice was an intrusion into English post-Reformation theology and had no counterpart either in Caroline divinity or among the Non-Jurors. His book is of the greatest value in outlining the different theories of presence and sacrifice held by the various Tractarians, and in calling attention to such opponents as Dean Goode, Dr. Harrison, and Mr. Dimock, to whose very real scholarship a scant justice is often meted out in histories of the period. It is so often assumed by Anglo-Catholic authors that the contemporary opponents of the Oxford Movement were ignorant and bigoted, that it is refreshing to remember the profound learning of Dr. Goode. It is impossible to allow that they were responsible for the greater degree of parochial efficiency and a corresponding loss of learning and culture ushered in during the epoch of Bishop Wilberforce. Canon Mackean has written a book which deserves wide recognition, although in the event of revision, may we suggest that he should devote fuller treatment to the relation of the Romantic Revival to sacramentalism and that he should include in his study the high sacramental doctrine of Mr. Gladstone? We trust that his book will receive the attention it deserves. It is an effective antidote to much of the literature which has preceded it this year.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.

THROUGH THE EYES OF A METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE*

Probably few persons are better acquainted with the moral, social and economic conditions of England than are our Metropolitan Magistrates. When, therefore, they speak on these themes they deserve serious attention. *Marriage, Children and God,* by Mr. Claud Mullins, is such an utterance. Dr. Parsons, the Bishop of Southwark, in the Foreword which he contributes, commends Mr. Claud Mullins's volume on the ground that :—

> 'He deals with matters which are of crucial importance for the welfare of our nation and mankind. No-one who cares for the cause of human betterment can afford to ignore the issues with which he confronts us . . . The author challenges us to think and to think

* *Marriage, Children and God.* By Claud Mullins. With a Preface by the Bishop of Southwark. (George Allen and Unwin. 1933. Price 6/-.)

boldly about certain facts which must be faced. The facts are some of them very ugly: the consideration of them is disagreeable. Yet a not unnatural disinclination to face them is no excuse for shirking them. Mr. Claud Mullins has brought together a great deal of relevant material which has not, so far as I know, been brought together by anyone else, at any rate, in so short and untechnical a form . . . those who disagree with him are bound, in view of the facts which he presents and of the circumstances in which a vast number of children are being brought up to-day, to show something more impressive in support of their case than the undisputed fact that what they oppose is not in conformity with inherited traditions.'

In his opening chapter on the fruits of ignorance the author states that among the most prolific causes of domestic or parental failure 'is the ignorance in sexual relations' and the primary remedy for this is sexual education in the light of modern knowledge.

This education must, among other things, Mr. Claud Mullins is assured, include a knowledge of the use of contraceptives. In this connection, he appositely cites the Bishop of Liverpool:—

'Man's advance in civilization is the story of his growing control of nature for worthy ends. That his new power of interference may be mis-used, as in the case of drugs, is no argument against his right to use it. Our power to control procreation is the latest step in that advance. It is within the purpose of God, and, like every previous step, it makes a new demand upon our moral responsibility. We must face this demand, not by refusing the power, but by using it aright.'

The moral and religious problem with which humanity is faced by this new knowledge of contraceptives has led the Bishop of Southwark to formulate four important questions upon the right answers to which the solution of the problem must depend. These four questions are:—

(1) Has a period been reached in the development of society in which the deliberate control and limitation of the quantity of babies for the sake of their quality is indicated as a duty which a Christian civilization ought to recognise and inculcate?

(2) Does the discovery of modern contraceptive methods at such a juncture suggest a wise and healthy way of fulfilling this duty in the interests of parents and children alike?

(3) Is the use of material means, chemical or mechanical, to prevent the beginning of life which might otherwise occur, in itself necessarily wrong?

(4) Can we, or can we not, rightly consider the use of such contraceptive methods under certain circumstances as being, like the use of anaesthetics, surgical instruments and other scientific discoveries for the prevention of suffering and disease, a form of co-operation with God?

The practical issue to-day seems to be mainly, not whether the imparting of education in the use of contraceptives is right, but how to impart that education, and to secure that it is acted on among vast numbers of our most ignorant and morally undisciplined classes. Mr. Claud Mullins concludes his chapter on 'Contraception and Religion' with the pertinent observation:—

'Indeed I am bold enough to say that the churches are now called, not to pronounce on the advisability of contraception, but to decide whether it is not their duty to spread knowledge about it, to teach its

necessity to themselves and to do all that they can to guard against its abuse.'

It is important in this connection to note that Mr. Claud Mullins is no believer in what is euphemistically called the 'new morality.' He writes :—

'Despite all my impatience at the pastoral teaching of the churches and at much of the ecclesiastical opposition to sound sexual teaching, I have lost none of my faith in the fundamentals of our generally-accepted morality. It has been well said that "certain moralists suspect all actions which originate in intense and spontaneous pleasure of being immoral, and look upon all actions which originate in a sense of stern duty as the only righteous actions." I do not hold with this austere Puritanism, but neither do I believe in the relaxation of the essential bonds which have held society together for hundreds of years. The fundamentals of the old morality are in my belief immutable . . . Not only do I accept the fundamentals of the old morality, but despite all that I have written about the religious teaching now given, I accept with genuine conviction the religious basis of morality. Man is not able to stand alone, and perhaps least of all with his sexual problems.'

But he adds :—

'Religion can only help if it accepts both the facts of to-day and the knowledge of to-day.'

Dr. Crichton-Miller, the eminent psychologist, gives good reason at least for this when he writes :—

'No departure from monogamy can be considered with any serious regard to the emotional development of children.'

The method of supressing knowledge, Mr. Claud Mullins is convinced, is a hopeless way of attempting to improve morals and he enforces his conclusions by the statement that :—

'In the United States what is known as the Comstock Obscenity Law against contraceptives has been just as successful as were the Prohibition Laws against alcohol.'

Our author seems convinced that Roman Catholicism is bound later to modify its embargo on contraceptives. The popular notion that the Roman Church is unchanging is fallacious. It does change and has changed when necessity renders immutability impossible. But besides the use of contraceptives our author is of opinion that sterilization, voluntary or compulsory, has its eugenic value. He writes :—

'It is my sincere belief that the question of sterilization has to be seriously examined. Compulsory sterilization is not yet a practical question : but I believe that in plenty of cases the churches and social organizations should use their influence to encourage voluntary sterilization. I go so far as to say that the churches should be prepared in proper cases to teach sterilization as a duty. The mother with, say, four children and a small and uncertain income ought to be brought to realize the moral crime of having more babies, and, where both abstention and contraception are impracticable, voluntary sterilization should be definitely taught as a duty to the existing children. I am convinced that many thousands of women would welcome it wholeheartedly, once they have an adequate family and the position was clearly put to them and the alternatives faced. At present even voluntary sterilization is of doubtful legality, and a Bill is now before Parliament to remove all doubts.'

H.D.A.M.

SIR OLIVER LODGE'S PHILOSOPHY*

In his brief preface the author tells us that his intention at first was to write a scientific treatise about the Ether of Space; 'but,' he adds, 'when in my old age I came to write this book I found that I could no longer keep my treatise within the proposed scientific confines, it escaped in every direction, and now I find it has grown into a comprehensive statement of my philosophy.'

The work is therefore both scientific and philosophical; it is not science 'in a nutshell,' nor 'philosophy whilst you wait.' And in this age of hurry it cannot become a popular book like some of Sir Oliver's shorter volumes. It demands study and unfortunately real students are comparatively scarce, even among the clergy. The book is a unity, not a series of essays, in which science and philosophy are closely woven. Part I gives a survey of physical existence, stressing the fact, now accepted by science, that it is the properties of space which should chiefly engage our attention; and matter, only because it is by the action of those properties on particles of matter that we can discover what those unseen forces are doing. 'What I am sure of,' Sir Oliver writes, 'is that no explanation will be obtained by a study of material processes alone. The particles of a brain are, like any other particles, inert. If they operate so as to achieve results it must be because they are acted upon by something which controls the particles.' That 'Something' resides in the Ether of Space, which he believes to be the habitat not only of electric forces but of Life and Mind.

If Part II seems too technical for some readers it can be omitted. Part III deals with Life and Mind: Part IV with evidence for survival; this includes the author's views on the bearing of his philosophy on Religion, and the Christian faith in particular. This should make special appeal to readers of this journal if they are willing to act on his advice to 'put aside prejudice, be guided by the evidence, and search for truth.' The last two chapters of Part IV are headed 'The Spiritistic Hypothesis,' and 'The Bearing of the Theory on Religion'; but actual evidence in support of this Theory is only very briefly quoted; that must be sought elsewhere. The close connection between this part of his philosophy and the scientific study which precedes it is indicated on page 294. After defining what he means by the term 'spirit' in relation to man, he says: 'My doctrine at present is that this transcendental immaterial entity needs and always will need something physical, not necessarily material—for its manifestation, that it is never really without a "body," even though it be discarnate. The mechanism of flesh which was utilized here was indeed temporary, but that was never its primary mechanism. The primary physical mechanism associated with spirit is not gross matter, spirit can only interact with matter under difficulties for a time; its real permanent existence is in the freedom of space, with an ethereal mechanism, whose properties do not appeal to the senses, and therefore are at present beyond our ken.' It is easy to recognise how this 'doctrine' might bear on religion, but space makes it impossible to discuss this here in detail. It is only possible to indicate the importance of this book, in which a great scientist has set forth the philosophic outcome of a life devoted to the study of the properties of Space, and to the evidence for the reality of a spiritual world and the survival of personality. His remarks on the Resurrection and the Empty Tomb will arrest attention, though perhaps their cogency can only be properly appreciated by those who have knowledge of Psychical Research.

HELEN ALMA DALLAS.

* *My Philosophy*. By Sir Oliver Lodge. (Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1933. 21/-.)

ASPECTS OF EVOLUTION*

The pendulum swings back. Already the reaction against Darwinism is well-established, and Mr. Migeod shows with great clarity why this is so. His book is invaluable to those interested in modern views of evolution, for though the author reaches few constructive conclusions, he sets forth innumerable facts of nature which demand explanation, and many of which are not accounted for by the older theories; further, he quotes freely from many recent writers on the subject. He discusses at length such important questions as Variation, Mutation, Homoplasy, Holism, Domestication, Mimicry, Habit and Instinct. He inclines to the view that Instinct is inherited Habit, and that it can be regarded as capitalised racial intelligence. A new habit indicates a new variety, and when consolidated into an instinct perhaps a new species. Every species connotes different habits and instincts; these being mental attributes, the author would argue that species derive their origin primarily from mind. He supports this contention by reference to inorganic matter, which appears consistently and ubiquitously, yet neither reproduces itself nor evolves, and he reaches the conclusion that evolutionary development acts through the mind-part, and not the material-part of the living whole. Thus any idea of an internal mechanistic force must be replaced by the concept of an external creative force, every change being the result of a separate act of creation (p. 109). 'One is therefore forced to demand the restoration of creative force to its old position of supremacy in accounting for the origin of living things.' After half a century of mechanistic evolution, the idea of 'special creations' is a bitter pill.

Dealing with theories of evolution, Mr. Migeod associates himself (p. 107) with B. C. Gruenberg, who says: '. . . while the evidence shows there has been succession with modification, from the very nature of the material it cannot be proved that there has been descent as well as succession.' Again (p. 104) the author himself says: '. . . while descent need not necessarily be entirely eliminated, there is on the whole little more than succession to be seen. It may be orderly, and one type may proximate to another following it, but some other cause than descent is needed to account for the process.'

Summing up (p. 113) he says: 'Evolution as a special theory has sunk . . . to being merely a paper record of accomplished facts. Creativeness is an all-pervasive force in nature . . . it would be difficult to recognise the creation of matter, life and mind without accepting a maker thereof, who may work by any of the various methods we find have been employed.' Yet in the whole book 'God' is mentioned only once, and then in a quotation.

The second swing of the pendulum is shorter than the first; it will not return to the angels.

G. F. Cope.

THE CHALLENGE OF AN INDIAN EXPERIENCE†

Bishop E. J. Palmer, formerly of Bombay, has, like 'the judicious Hooker,' a blessed clearness in his teaching and a no less blessed brevity. His booklet, *The Challenge of an Indian Experience*,† is highly significant. It deals in pithy fashion with the strength and weakness of the Oxford Movement, lessons for the Church of England from the Anglican Churches overseas, and the doctrine of the Eucharist as it would naturally be understood in India.

* *Aspects of Evolution.* By F. W. H. Migeod. (Heath Cranton, 1933. 5/-.)

† *The Challenge of an Indian Experience.* By Edwin James Palmer, D.D., Bishop of Bombay, 1908—1929. (Published by Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 1933. 1/- net.)

The Tractarian Movement, he holds, began badly, but it learnt by experience, and finally took over from Liberal Churchmen the modern view of the Scriptures and the duty of the Church in the sphere of social reform. He values, rather more highly than we do, the Oxford Movement's specifically 'Catholic' contributions, *viz.* its anti-Erastianism, its Eucharistic worship, and its practice of Sacramental confession. He contends, however, very stoutly against the high Catholic doctrine (1) 'that our Lord's intention in instituting the Blessed Sacrament of His Body and Blood was to provide a focus in which He could be worshipped'; (2) 'that for this Sacrament [*i.e.* the Eucharist] or for the forgiveness of sins a priest is essentially and indispensably necessary.'

Dr. Palmer claims that the Church of England has learnt four lessons from the English Communions overseas: (1) The use of Diocesan Synods and conferences in Church life, including the revival of Convocation; (2) The art of combining federal unity with local independence; (3) The vision of the eventual unity of Christendom; (4) The urgent need for the achievement of this unity.

Here again we cannot fail to note that if in the matter of a freer organization the Colonial Churches had in earlier days a possible advantage over the Church of England, they have none now. Their constitutions, incorporated in their Trust Deeds and sanctioned by the Acts of their Dominion Parliaments, make fundamental reform, whether constitutional, doctrinal or liturgical, as hard for them as such things are for us. In all other departments of Church life the Churches overseas are behind the Church in England. The *personnel* of their episcopate, for the most part locally elected by their Diocesan Synod, is far below the level of our English episcopate appointed by the Crown; though the education of our English clergy needs to be improved, theirs stands in much greater need. The Church in England, owing to its relation to the State, has a comprehensive breadth of membership which includes extreme Anglo-Catholics, extreme Protestant Evangelicals, and extreme English Modernists; whereas the Dominion Churches, in a number of cases, exhibit a depressing narrowness of type, whether it be in South Africa on the one hand or in Canada on the other.

The Bishop's exposition of the Indian view of the Eucharist is illuminating. The Indian Christian is unable to interpret it otherwise than symbolically. The belief that God comes into material objects in order to be worshipped in them is for an Indian Christian idolatry. In the following words the Bishop sums up very beautifully Christ's teaching to His disciples on the significance of the Last Supper:

> 'I am going away; men will see Me no more. I do not want them to see Me except—except in *you!* I will dwell in you. I will give you My nature. You shall be My Body.'

We can see many signs that the Liberal Catholicism of Dr. Palmer, sincere, sympathetic, practical, as eager for truth as it is for freedom and love, is becoming more and more widely diffused in the ranks of Anglo-Catholicism. H.D.A.M.

THE PLAIN MAN'S SEARCH FOR GOD*

'The crux of the matter is that to-day we have no clear conception of the activity of God, no thought of how God makes contact with men individually, no conviction of a truly living God' (p. 26).

* *The Plain Man seeks for God.* By Henry P. Van Dusen. (Charles Scribner. 1933. 8/6.)

'To the average layman of to-day the Will of God is that general answer to a particular situation, which, all things considered, best fits the circumstances. It is man's common-sense judgment of the best thing to do, slightly sanctified by pious reference to Deity' (p. 30).

'A machine which is built to run but remains ever idle ultimately becomes unfit to run. How much more, a God who is claimed to exercise personal activity but is never known to do so will not long continue as a vital reality, the living God of living religion. This would seem to be the predicament of contemporary theism—unless it can regain a reasoned conviction of the dynamic agency of God, God as a power in human life will disappear' (p. 32).

These qotations sufficiently indicate the problem which Mr. Van Dusen sets out to solve. It is a problem with which we are being made increasingly familiar. Mr. Van Dusen covers much of the ground already treated by Mr. Lippmann in *Preface to Morals*, by Mr. Laurence Hyde, Mr. Middleton Murry, and others who are dealing with the relationship between Theism and Humanism.

Having stated his problem, Mr. Van Dusen proceeds to trace its origin. This he finds in two sources. The first is 'the critical, sceptical intellectual outlook . . . born of the thought of Hume and Kant . . . furthered by the rise of scientific philosophy.' The second is 'the character of modern civilization, the actual mechanized fabric of daily living, as science has made it possible for us.' Having traced the development of these two influences, his conclusion is that they have conspired together to discredit 'the knowability of ultimate reality' and to banish certainty from the religious outlook of the modern mind.

Having analysed the present situation, Mr. Van Dusen goes on to the constructive side of his argument. This falls into two parts. In the first he follows the inductive method. He presents in clear and simple fashion data which may be found in modern science, of which a full interpretation requires a philosophy of values, which itself passes beyond those data, and such a philosophy of values in its turn points beyond itself to the reality of God. Summarizing his conclusions he suggests that the figure which least unworthily represents to our minds the character of God, the nature of human life, and God's part in it, is that of a great drama. The drama requires four principal factors. First there is the stage setting, the scenery. The stage setting for the drama of life is 'the world of physical nature . . . the principles and laws which determine that our world shall be the kind of world it is . . . The scenery is the creation of the dramatist. It is appropriate to his plan for the play. But to a considerable extent it is fixed . . . he does not constantly interfere with it . . . The important question is not "Is it perfect?" but "Is it an appropriate setting for his drama?"' Second, there are the players, we ourselves who are called to take our parts. Third, there are the characters in the play and the plot. There are 'big' parts, and 'small' parts, but here again the important question is what does each make of his part. Finally, there is the dramatist. 'He proposes to the players their parts. But he leaves them free to play them poorly or well . . . It is his play. He alone knows fully all that it might be. He alone feels fully the failures and mistakes, the agony of careless execution. To the players he has committed the fate of that which his heart holds most dear . . . Like all great drama, life has its elements of tragedy and high comedy. But it is real tragedy and real comedy . . . Those who recognize their parts for what they are, who seek as fully as may be to catch the purpose of the Dramatist, his feel for his story, his hope for its outcome, his

expectation of them . . . these may know the consummate joy which the drama of human life can furnish, the sharing in creative and eternally significant living with the Author and the Purposer . . . of their lives' (p. 145 ff).

We have quoted this passage at length because we believe that many will find the figure a helpful one. We are sadly in need of modern parables, and Mr. Van Dusen has given us a very good one.

Having finished with the inductive approach to the reality of God, the author turns right-about, and begins at the other end, some would say, though unjustifiably, 'in the air.' The inductive approach, necessary as it may be, fails completely to answer the plain man's questions for two reasons. In the first place it supposes that the plain man is endowed with far greater intellectual ability than is in fact the case. The plain man's interest in religion is not primarily intellectual at all. The inductive approach also fails because it seldom leads to the God of religion. 'He that cometh to God must believe that He is and that He is the rewarder of them that seek after Him.' The inductive approach leaves us quite firmly *on the ground.* That is its final and ultimate weakness. When the issue is clear, and the inductive approach helps enormously to make it clear, then comes the moment when the individual must choose. We do not think that Mr. Van Dusen overstates the case when he closes his book with the words, 'In our day, to men and women with minds alert to understand the modern world, the choice lies clear — between a noble but ultimately despairing Stoicism and the life of faith.'

Mr. Van Dusen has made an able contribution to the statement of this issue, and we can heartily recommend his work to those who are awake to the choice before them and seek light by which to make it.

R. McKay.

RATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM*

Mr. Austen Verney judges that much of the post-war prescription for our current ills fails because 'it is confined to mechanism — the detached treatment of some aspect of the position, currency, unemployment, tariffs, or what not.' His book 'is concerned with doctrine rather than with mechanism.' He discusses 'The Spiritual Dilemma,' 'The State *contra mundum*,' The Economic Conundrum' and other large issues; in the course of his chapters there is much that is informative and much that is thought-provoking: the general approach can be described by such adjectives as 'cultural,' 'liberal' and 'humanist.' He makes 'a cultural approach to the economic problems' and holds a liberal view of the State: naturally he criticises the anti-liberal movements in Europe. 'The Liberal doctrine,' he writes, 'is largely of English creation, and even here is more an instinct of revolt against old restrictions and inequalities than the expression of a consistent and comprehensive social philosophy. This is still in the making; but so far as it has been empirically formulated it is due to the Rationalistic spirit.' The life of a free society 'can only be reached through open-mindedness, the frankest canvass of all propositions, the severest testing in the light of experience of all institutions and modes. The distinctive attribute of a society of free thinkers is that it consist of people who *think.*' This plea for thought and freedom, while not new, is timely. Dr. Albert Schweitzer has recently said that the modern 'disdain for thinking' puts him in sharp antagonism to the spirit of the age, and Mr. Verney might have said more on this theme. Where we differ from Mr. Verney is in his sweeping

* *Rationalist Evaluations and the True Direction of Civilisation.* By Austen Verney. (Heath Cranton, 1932. pp. 212. 7/6.)

assertion of 'the incongruity of a free polity with Christian theology—whatever the precise brand of its interpretation.' The belief in a free polity has had not a few Christian advocates, who have held that a true theology positively required it, and who have regretted the undue dominance of the note of authority in Catholic theology and of intolerance in Protestant practice. It is to the Reformation we owe the belief in 'a liberty for tender consciences,' and however feebly that faith was at first followed and however great our debt to the thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment, who often felt themselves alien to the Church of their day, yet this faith in freedom has increasingly commended itself to Christian people as something essential to God's way of redemption. Nor can we do other than regret that Mr. Verney puts Christianity and Rationalism in antithesis. His attitude contrasts sharply with Dr. Schweitzer's: the latter has recently confessed, 'I know that I myself owe it to thinking that I was able to retain my faith in religion and Christianity'; and many who would not share all Dr. Schweitzer's opinions, would bear similar testimony. But then Mr. Verney quotes no modern theologians except a press account of a sermon by the Bishop of Birmingham: to it he makes a courteous reply, of which the chief note is a wistful agnosticism. In the course of it he tells of 'the theologian lays claim to a direct or occult knowledge' of the attributes of God, and elsewhere we are told that 'the orthodox attitude to the teaching and narrative of the New Testament is one of uncritical laudation and implicit acceptance of its truth.' After such statements we are prepared for the opinion that 'large sections of its (the Church of England's) hierarchy and membership are only interested in mummeries and incantations that more fitly accord with the culture of the Stone Age.' Nor can Mr. Verney give the devil his due: quoting the phrase in the Catechism about the state of life unto which it shall please God to call me, he remarks, 'The future tense here does not alter the implication.' Just because we share the writer's faith in a free society, we welcome criticism of Christianity, but if such criticism is to be profitable, it should be directed against the Christian Faith, not as misunderstood by the uneducated but as expounded in the standard works of recognised theologians. In such works will be found further support for many of the 'evaluations' which Mr. Verney puts forward sincerely and forcibly. In particular his economic 'evaluations' have much in common with those put forward by an Anglo-Catholic, Mr. M. B. Reckitt, in his latest book, *Faith and Society*.

H. G. MULLINER.

CORRESPONDENCE

A UNITARIAN MINISTER IN LIVERPOOL CATHEDRAL.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*.

SIR,

The Church Press, stirred up to bitterness by letters to the *Guardian* from Lord Hugh Cecil and Bishop Welldon, and of course the antagonism of the *Church Times*, calls the attention of Modern Churchmen to the innovation of the Liverpool Cathedral authorities in inviting a Unitarian minister (Rev. Lawrence Redfern) to preach at the ordinary Morning Service on Assize Sunday, October 22nd last.

Can we endorse the note in the *Inquirer*, 'All honour to the Dean and Chapter of Liverpool Cathedral for their courage and wisdom in extending the invitation, and all honour to the preacher for nobly responding to the demands of so important an occasion'?

While a great improvement has taken place in the dogmatism on the definitions of the Trinity, and the Unitarian position has become less opposed to the spiritual mystery of the Trinity, the vehemence of orthodoxy as expressed by the Ecclesiastical Press is hardly less bitter now than it was sixty odd years ago, when Dean Stanley invited the Company of Revisers of the Authorised Version, including Nonconformists and a Unitarian Minister (Dr. Vance Smith) to partake of Holy Communion in Westminster Abbey. The Communion of June 22nd, 1870, was vehemently denounced (see *Life of Dean Stanley*, by Prothero, p. 383) by the religious press and by the English Church Union as 'a deliberate embodiment of insult and defiance to the whole of Catholic Christendom,' and as 'an act of desecration' and as 'a blasphemous act of a dignitary of the Church,' who 'has cast pearls before swine and given that which is most holy to the dogs.'

Dean Stanley, in defending his action, wrote: 'It was with very great thankfulness that I was able to be the means of gathering together in remembrance of our common Lord these various persons, being convinced that in so doing I was obeying His command to His disciples that they should love one another, and following His example by joining in the same good work and in the same Holy Communion with persons of the most various opinions.'

And Dr. Vance Smith added: 'To me the service was, and is, a simple commemoration of the self-sacrifice and the death of our common Lord and Master, and I did not apprehend that anyone would object to my presence, whatever my own personal difficulty might be. I was amazed at the outburst — of what shall I term it? — which immediately followed, very much as if I had been a heathen, or an unbelieving Jew, or had gone to scoff.'

The eloquent and very thoughtful sermon in question, of Mr. Redfern in Liverpool Cathedral, thus described by a correspondent: 'In the loftiness of its thought, in the beauty of its language, in the manner of its delivery, in a tone which penetrated to every corner of the great building, it made a profound impression,' concluded with these words, quoted from the *Inquirer*, with which the most orthodox could not disagree, and which all may take to heart: 'When the Word became flesh in Galilee long ago, it was the same flesh that it entered, the same numberless handicaps and restrictions of the flesh it assumed. And yet there it found its opportunity for beauty and richness of living, and we have beheld its glory full of grace and truth. That is the miracle, the only miracle that we need. Deep down in everything God will implant himself. And in that confidence you may step out with courage. In that confidence you may be of good heart as one who is protected by legions of angels.

> Knowledge we ask not — knowledge thou hast lent,
> But, Lord, the Will — there lies our bitter need,
> Give us to build above the deep intent
> The deed, the deed.'

H. J. PALMER,
Canon Emeritus of Ripon.

Worthing.
December 1st, 1933.

SIR,

WHAT DOES MR. HARDWICK MEAN?

Mr. Hardwick's article on 'The Church and the Age' in your November number is surely pitched in too low a key. To write that the masses are debauched and lowered 'mentally and emotionally below the level where

the Church can get at them' is surely to condemn the Church. If that is the case she may as well shut up shop. But surely it is palpably an overstatement.

Again what does Mr. Hardwick mean when he says 'the clap-trap talked about the disinterestedness of science . . . has been exposed'? Scientists must get a living of course, but surely no-one questions their disinterested devotion to truth.

And lastly the 'innate *bestiality* and unreason' of human nature, exposed by modern psychology. It was not modern psychology but biology that revealed to man his animal origin. There is nothing very new in that. The revelation of Christianity is that man is a *spiritual* animal. But I fancy that by bestiality Mr. Hardwick means sexuality. Well the post-Victorian world is now trying to face the fact that sex is the most fundamental division of human nature, and goes to the roots of life. I should have thought that modern psychology was trying to teach us not to cover up but to face our innate *sexuality*, in order to realise the immense creative power that, realised sacramentally, it may bring to our lives. As to unreason, it is difficult to persuade Mr. Hardwick that intuition, direct vision, is not the same as animal instinct, but I would like to ask him whether he thinks the Prophets of Israel, the Sermon on the Mount, the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides were the work of pure reason alone.

Addington Green, T. B. LUARD.
W. Malling, Kent.

TRADITIONALIST VERSUS MODERNIST.

SIR,

Those of your readers who do not always find it easy to give a satisfying explanation of Modernism to enquirers will be grateful to you for your outspoken, stimulating, and constructive article 'Has Modernism a Gospel?' in the November issue of the *Modern Churchman*. If I venture to ask you to give renewed consideration to one statement, and one only, it is not in any criticizing spirit, but rather to point out what I conceive to be a little danger, and also to suggest a line of thought often overlooked. I refer to your statement that 'the true opposite of Modernist is Traditionalist.'

At our last Conference, during the debate on the paper, 'The Character and Call of the Church of England,' an impassioned, and somewhat unnecessary plea that Modernists should not think lightly of tradition was made by a speaker of some prominence. He emphasised his point by drawing attention to the important part played by tradition in the schools, Army, and other branches of the national life. I think the speaker gravely misunderstood the Modernist's attitude of mind towards tradition, but are you not unwittingly giving encouragement to such misunderstanding when you place Modernist and Traditionalist at opposite poles?

Why not meet the Traditionalist on his own ground, and challenge his right to the name?

May it not be claimed that it was the spirit of Modernism that impelled the revered Saints and leaders of the past to improve upon the religious beliefs of their day? I am convinced that these great men would have repudiated the idea that their labours, embodied in creeds and doctrine, were to be treated as final, and adequate to the needs of the twentieth century. The true Traditionalist must be something more than a cold-storage keeper. He must be creative, and ever anxious to maintain the growing and evolving power of tradition.

I think, therefore, that we should assert our right to be looked upon as Traditionalists of a truer type than those to whom the name is generally applied, for I consider it to be the chief mission of the Modernist to preserve and hand down the spirit of religious endeavour rather than its visible results in lettered form, knowing that, in course of time, these latter must become inadequate to express ever advancing knowledge of God and His World.

H. A. GARNETT.

Worthing.
November 29th, 1933.

THE ESSENCE OF TOLERANCE.

SIR,

After your appreciative reference to my article in *The Informant* it may seem ungracious to say that I find something lacking in your comments on it.

There is doubtless a time to confute error, and a time to hold one's tongue. For my own part, I am very loth to break silence, when the man I think wrong is living a life close to God and ascribes his inspiration to those very views of his that seem to me erroneous.

Surely, however, the essence of toleration lies not in knowing when to attack (Bishop Lightfoot) or how to attack (judicious Hooker) but in an attitude of continual anxiety to discover what aspects of truth, hitherto perhaps neglected by me, lies in my opponent's case.

Tolerance of this positive character is not likely to degenerate into indifference. Indeed it is born of humility and the deepest reverence for truth—so many sided and containing elements of a moral and emotional character as well as those more purely intellectual.

ARTHUR DAVIES.

Ivy Gates,
Berkhamstead.
November 19th, 1933.

MODERNIST SERMONS IN THE CITY.

SIR,

I shall be grateful if you would kindly allow me to draw the attention of your readers to the enclosed Course of Lectures which will be given in St. Edmund's Church, Lombard Street, London, E.C., by kind permission of the Rev. Hon. J. G. Adderley.

Thursday, January 11th, at 1.10 *p.m.:* 'False Ideas of God,' Rev. T. J. Wood, Organising Secretary.

Thursday, January 18th: 'Modernism in Religion,' Canon Harold Anson.

Thursday, January 25th: 'Reason and Enthusiasm,' Guy Kendall, University College School.

Thursday, February 1st: 'Fundamentalism,' Canon J. S. Bezzant, B.D.

Thursday, February 8th: 'Some Hard Sayings of Jesus Christ,' Rev. Dr. Major, Ripon Hall.

T. J. WOOD.

M.C.U., The Church House,
Westminster, London, S.W.1.